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Where a depot company contracts to furnish terminal facilities for the passenger
business of a railroad, it is bound to use ordinary care and diligence to keep its
premises in a safe condition for passengers ; and this obligation renders it liable for
knowingly employing, or allowing to be employed in the depot building, a man
of vicious temper, of bad character, and who frequently assaults passengers in a
wilful and vicious manner.
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COLLINS, J., August 5, 1889. The plaintiff appeals from an
order sustaining defendant's demurrer to the complaint, on the
ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. From said complaint, and a stipulation as to certain
facts, made by the parties, and by agreement considered as if
the facts therein stated had been a part of the pleadings demurred to, it appears that the defendant is a domestic corporation, organized for and engaged in the business of furnishing
and conducting an Union Depot and station-house in the city
of St. Paul, in which several lines of railway deliver and receive
passengers, by virtue of their contracts with defendant; that
on May 17th, 1888, plaintiff reached said depot as a passenger
upon one of the said roads, and with the intention of pursuing
his journey to a point beyond, by another road, entered the
station-house, approached the parcel-room therein, leased by
defendant to a tenant who operated and controlled it, for the
purpose of checking his valise and was there maliciously attacked and beaten by the man in charge, who was in fact the
employe of defendant's tenant. The complaint further alleges
that this employe was of vicious temper, of bad character, and
had frequently, in a wilful and malicious manner, assaulted and
beaten people lawfully upon the premises, during the six years
he had been employed in said parcel-room, all of which was
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known to the defendant on the day of the attack upon plaintiff.
In support of its demurrer, the defendant corporation contends, first, that it owed no duty whatever to the plaintiff, because no contractual relation existed between the parties; that
therefore he must look to the railway company, whose passenger he was or had been, for compensation for his injuries;
second, if it should be held that the duties imposed by railway
companies towards their arriving and departing passengers
have been assumed by the defendant, it is not responsible in
this case, because the alleged assault was not committed by
one of its servants or employes, but by the employe of a
tenant who was engaged in an independent business, wholly
disconnected from that of a common carrier of passengers, and
conducted solely for the accommodation and convenience of
those who choose to patronize the room and pay for the privilege of having their parcels temporarily taken care of. Finally,
if these positions prove untenable, it is argued that the assault
of the employe was for purposes of his own, outside of his
occupation, in disregard of the object for which he was employed, not committed in execution of it, and therefore, in no
event, can the defendant be held responsible. It has been announced by this Court, in Aklbeck v. St. P. H. & .f. Ry. Co. [decided in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, November 20, 1888]
that in respect to the handling and care of baggage, the relation between the defendant corporation and the carriers who
use its depot, is that of principal and agent. But under the
allegations of the complaint now before us, it is not essential
to determine the precise relations existing between the defendant (organized for the special purpose and under contract to
furnish to certain railway corporations proper and adequate
depot and station-house accommodations for those who are
entitled to use the same) and the plaintiff, who, arriving upon
the train of one of these carriers, remained its passenger until
he had an opportunity, by safe and convenient means, to leave
the cars, the railway and the station-house: Warrez v. Fichhuig Ry. Co. (1864), 8 Allen (Mass.) 227.
Nor is it necessary to pass upon the contention of the defendant, that whatever duty it owed the plaintiff as a passenger, it
cannot be held liable for the wilful act of the servant and em-
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ploye of one who had leased a room in its depot building for
the purpose of carrying on an independent business, not
required of the carriers of passengers and conducted by a
tenant, solely for the convenience of the traveling public.
Nor, as we regard the pleadings, need we regard the final position assumed by defendant, that the master is not responsible
for the wilful acts of his servant, performed outside of his employment, not in execution of it, and for purposes of his own,
although the subject has been referred to in McCord v. Westen U. T Co. [decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
September 4, 1888], in which is mentioned approvingly,
the case of Stewart v. Ry. Co. (1882), 90 N. Y. 588, whereby
Isaacsv. Third Avenue Co. (1871), 47 N. Y. I22-relied upon
by the respondent-was, in effect, overruled.
This complaint, considered in connection with the stipulation, charges that the defendant knowingly and advisedly permitted its tenant to keep in his employ, for more than six
years, in its depot building, into which it encouraged people
to come, and was under contract to admit the plaintiff as an
arriving passenger, a man of savage and vicious propensities
and who had, during said period of six years, frequently
assaulted and beaten persons lawfully upon said premises, and
who, upon the day named, attacked and beat the plaintiff without provocation. Whatever obligation otherwise, by virtue of
its contract with the carrier, rested upon the defendant as to
the plaintiff, it is manifest that it was bound to use ordinary
care and diligence to keep its premises in a safe condition for
those who legitimately came there. It had no more right,
therefore, to knowingly and advisedly employ, or allow to be
employed, in its depot building, a dangerous and vicious man,
than it would have to keep and harbor a dangerous and savage
dog, or other animal, or to permit a pitfall, or trap, into which
a passenger might step, as he was passing to or from his train.
Order reversed.
The doctrine announced in this case
is wholesome and salutary, and it is regretted that the principle upon which
it should rest, was not carefully considered and as emphatically announced,

It is contended by the writer that the
principle for this doctrine is, that the
proprietor, owner or controller of a place
open to and for the public, is bound, as
a matter of duty, to see that all persons
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who come there on the business for
which the place is open, are protected
from assaults and insults, because,having
the privilege of doing such a business
and inviting the public to come there,
he owes the duty to protect all who
come there on that business. This
principle was some years ago asserted
by the Indiana Court in Henry v. Dennis (1883), 93 Ind. 45z; and recently
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Romind v. Schasnbacher(1888), S20
Pa. 582; S.C., 27 A.ER. LAW REG. 156.
Thi3 is nothing more than the announcement of the general doctrine of duty
to another invited to a place of business.
It is objected that, if this principle is
carried to its legitimate conclusion, it
will hold responsible proprietors of
stores, and business houses, for assaults
and insults committed by strangers who
come there with the vicious purpose
and intent to do wrong. Is there any
reason why they should not be held responsible? If the proprietor had knowledge or notice of the vicious intent, or
propensity, or, with reasonable care,
could have had such notice, he should
be held responsible for his neglect of
duty, in not keeping such persons away.
If he did not have such notice, and
could not have had it by the exercise of
reasonable watchfulness and care, there
is then a reason for exemption from liability, but, as will hereafter appear, the
reason for the principle above stated
does not advance this distinction.
The Minnesota Court (Ak/beck v.
RailroadCo., supra, p. 23; AfeCord v.
Westernz Union Telegrapb Co., stepra,
p. 24), holds the defendant liable, because he did not keep his premises in
safe condition, free from dangerous and
vicious men, the same as he must keep
it free from dangerous and vicious dogs
or other animals, and free from pitfalls
or traps.
There are three different doctrines
announced in this supposed principle

given as the ground or reason for the
ruling in this case: the first is the principle which governs the liability resulting from defective and dangerous premises; the-second is the principle which
controls liability for injuries from dangerous and vicious dogs or other animals; and the third,those applicable
to human beings.
The principles which control the law
applicable to the actions of man, are
different from those regulating the
liability for defective premises, or dangerous and other animals. The principles of the law of liability for defective
premises are confined to the unsafe
condition, arising from unsafe construction, repair or use, as for instance injuries from pit-falls, the law of which
has remained substantially the same
since the case of lyth v. Top ham
(1603), Cro. Jac. 158; Roll Abr. 88;
or injuries from spring guns and other
instruments of destruction, first discussed
in Deane v. Clayton (1817), 7 Taunt.
489 ; and developed in Ilolt v. Wilkes
(1820), 3 Barn. and Aid. 304; Bird v.
Holbrook (1828), 4 Bing. 628; Wootton
v. Dawkinr (1857), 2 C. B. (N. S.)
413; Townsend v. Wathen. (i8o8), 9
East 277; Hooker v. Miller (1873),
37 Iowa 613; Johnson v. Patterson,
(184o), 14 Conn. I : Or injuries from
dangerous places, or dangerous instrumentalities, on private premises or private way, near the highway: liargreaves v. Deacon (1872), 25 Mich. I;
Kfohn v. orvett (1871), 44 Ga. 251;
Corby v. Hill (1858), 4 C. B. (N. S.)
554; Clark v. Chambers (1878), 3 Q.
B. Div. 327; or injuries from dangerous
places in business houses and grounds,
as defined in Carleton v. Franconia
Iron Co. (1868), 99 Mass. 216; and
Indeinaurv. Daine? (1866), L. R. i C.
P. 27 4 ; on Appeal (i867),2 C. P. 3 11 :
or dangerous places in public houses,
places of public resort, and exhibitions:
Francisv. Cockrell (187o), L. R. 5 Q.
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knowledge of the vicious propensities
and failed to exercise thz proper care
in restraint, because a dog was considered tame and harmless, and hence
to charge the owner or keeper, scienter
must be alleged and proved: Read v.
Edwards (x864), 17 C. B. (N. S.) 245;
Dearth v. Baker (1867), 22 Wis. 73;
Slingerv. Henneman(1875),38 Id. 504;
Fairchildv. Bentley (858), 30 Barb.
expressed by GRAY, J., in Carleton v.
(N.Y.) x47. This is the rule asto all ani.Franconia r'on Co. (1868), 99 Mass.
mals domits naturae, unless changed
216: "The owner, or occupant of
by State statute, but with respect to
premises is liable in damages to those
coming to it, using due care, at his in- wild animals, the owner, or keeper,
vitation or inducement, express or im- was held an insureragainst all injuries,
though the late cases seem to place the
plied, on any business to be transacted
liability upon the degree of care used,
or permitted by him, for an injury occa-ioned by the unsafe condition of the holding the keeper, or owner, to that
high degree of care which a knowledge
land, or of the access to it, which is
of the vicious propensities seems to deknown to him and not to them, and
mand: Cooley on Torts 349. In both
which he has negligently suffered to
exist and has given them no notice of." cases, the scientermust be alleged and
So, AfcDonald v. Chicago, etc., .R. Co. proved, because, knowing the vicious
and dangerous propensities, it is his
(1869), 26 Iowa 124; Toledo, etc., R.R.
Co. v. Grush (1873), 67 Ill. 262; Lis- duty to adopt such measures, and use
such precaution and restraint as will
comb v. N. J.,'et., Trans. Co. (1872),
6 Lans. (N. Y.) 75; Picardv. Smith prevent injury from such propensities:
(1861), IO C. B. (N. S.) 470; lartin Alayv. Burdett (1846), 9 Q. B. io;
Earl v. Van Astine (1850), 8 Barb.
v. Great Northern R. Co. (1855), I6
C. B. 179 ; Clussman v. Long )sland, (N. Y.) 630; Van Leuven v. Lyke
(1848), I N. Y. 515; Loomis v. Terry
etc., R.Co. (1877), 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 618.
The care demanded is reasonable care (1837),07 Wend. (N. Y.) 496.
A careful and exhaustive research
only: Pittslurgh,etc., R. Co. v. Brigham
(1876), 29 Ohio St. 374; Indiana,etc., has failed to discover any authority,
where this doctrine has been applied to
R. Co. v. Zrudleson (1859), 13 Ind. 325;
W ter v. London, etc., R. Co. (1869),
human beings, because the purposes,
causes, and reasons, fortthe birth and
L. R. 4 Q. B. 693; Chicago, etc., R. Co.
v. IWilson (1872), 63 Il. r67; Corn- existence of the doctrine are not applicable to man, and it is believed that no
inan v. Eastern CountiesR. Co. (1859),
4 Hurl. & Nor. 781 ; Cross v. L. S. &
court, and no writer, has heretofore asN S. R. R. Co. (1888), 27 AMER. LAW serted such an application. Among
REG. 405.
the many reasons for the non-applicaThe liability for injuries by vicious
bility of this doctrine to the acts of man,
and dangerous dogs, or other animals,
discoverable by a study of the cases, is
rests on different principles; see a the primitive one, that with all law and
lengthy annotation to Worthen v. Love, at all times, man has been recognized as
27 AMER. LAW REG. 631. At coma rational being, not possessing and innon law, the owner of a dog was not
capable of exercising the propensities
iable for its vicious acts, unless he had of the dog, or other animal, but pos3. 184; or school buildings: Donovan
v. Board of Education (1878), 55
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 176; Bassett v.
Fish (1877), 12 Hun. (N. Y.) 209.
The application of this principle to
railroad depots, stations, platforms and
approaches, means that these must be
free from such defects, as far as reasonable care can make them; and is well
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sessed of the faculties of a rational and
responsible actor and punishable as
such, for any criminal transgression;
that being the only way, known to all
law, to regulate the action of man, except when devoid of this rational element, in which case he would be placed
custodia legis.
Upon the ground of public policy,
and as an essential in the regulation
and protection of diversified rights in
communities, this elementary law (that
the only remedy for a crime, is the punishment, civilly and criminally, of the
person who commits it) has been modified, or changed, with respect to innkeepers, carriers of passengers, assaults,
etc., committed by servants, while acting within the line of their duty, and
now by the Pennsylvania (Rommelv.
Schambacher(I887), 126 Pa. 582; s.c.,
27 AMER. LAW REG. 156) and Minnesota courts (in Ahlbeck v. St. Paul, P.
AZf &A . Co., and AfeCord v. Wcsent
Union Tel. Co., sitpra, pp. 23, 24), to
places open to and for the entertainment of the public. In these cases, the
principal is held responsible for the assaults, or insults, which lie did not commit. He is punished civiliter,for a crime
which another committed, because public policy exacts the duty of protection
in such cases, and holds him, who is
required to exercise that duty, liable for
any fai!ure or neglect.
Within the law governing the liability
of innkeepers, may be found the whole
and true principle for holding one man
civilly responsible for a crime committed by another, and the application of
this doctrine to the other classes, is not
the advancement of a new principle in
the law. There is no difference between the reasons which bold the innkeeper responsible, and those for holding a master liable for the assaults of
his servant, while doing the business
with which he was entrusted, and
holding a railroid liable for assaults by

its employees. It is settled that a carrier is liable for an assault upon a passenger, whether committed by an employe or a stranger. Some jurisdictions place the liability on the ground
of contract, and others on the ground of
duty, while the minority of the cases exclude all liability for assault, unless
committed by the servant within the
scope of his duty, but do "not define
what is or what is not within the line of
the servant's duty. Prominent in following this judicial jugglery is the
Supreme Court of Ohio in ( Witinore v.
L. Jl1. R. .R. Co. (x869), i9 Ohio St.
Iio) holding the carrier not liable where
the baggage checker struck the passenger with a hatchet whilst in the act of
checking his baggage, on the ground
that the servant was hired to check
baggage and not to use the hatchet or
assault passengers, hence he was acting
outside the scope of his duty. Whether
the principle for the liability is that of
contract or duty, the weight of the
decisions hold the carrier bound to protect the passenger during the ingress to
the carriage, and the exit. The principle for the protection during the carriage in the conveyance of the carrier, is
plain, no matter whether it rests on
contract or duty, because it is only a
distinction of terms, and not of substance, to say, that as matter of law,
the passenger contracted for safe transportation (as most clearly announced in
Chamberlainv. Chandler(1823), U. S.
C. Ct. Dist. Mass., 3 Mason 242), or
that the law imposes the duty of safe
transportation.
For an assn-ult committed on a passenger during the time he is being carried in the conveyance, the weight of
the authority is that the liability rests
on contract; namely, that the passenger contracted for safe transportation, and an assault is a breach of that
contract; or, in other wor.ls, the law
i,npo;es the duty of safe transp rtation
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by virtue of the contract, whether the
breach is committed by a stranger, or
by a servant, without respect to the
question whether the servant was or
was not acting within the scope of his
duty: Chamberlainv. Chandler,sup ra,
p. 27; Nieto v. Clark (1858), U. S. C.
Ct., Dist. Mass., I Cliff. 145; Goddard
v. Grand Trunk R. R. (1869), 57 Me.
202; Craker v.Chicago,ec.,Ry. (1875),
36 Wis. 657; Chicago, ec., R. R. v.

(Y883), 2 Tex. Ct. App. 262; Bryat
v. Chicago, etc., R. R. (884) 63 Iowa
464. This liability is confined to the
period during which the passenger was
loeing carried in the carrier's conveyance; as where, during the carriage,
the brakeman struck the plaintiff because he intimated that the brakeman
stole his watch: Chicago, etc., R. R.
v. Flexonan (1882), 103 II. 546;
where the clerk assaulted the passen-

.Flexnan(1882), 103 Ill 546; Fa k t

ger:

Co. v. True (1878), 88 Id. 608; Sherley v. Billings (1871), 8 Bush. (Ky.)
147; McKinley v. R. R. (1876), 44
Iowa 314; New Orleans R. R. v.
Burke(I876), 53 Miss. 200; Bryant
v. Rich (187O), zo6 Mass. 18o; landreau v. Bell (1833), 5 La.(0.S.) 434;
Flintv. Trans. Co. (1868), 34 Conn.
R. R.v. Hinds
554; Pitlsburgh, etc.,

Bush. (Ky.) 147 ; where the conductor
kissed a lady passenger: Craker v.

Sherley v.

Rellings (1871),

&

Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (1875), 36 'Vis.

657; where the driver of the street car
assaulted and beat the plaintiff: Ste.-vart
v. Brooklyn, etc., R. R. (1882), 90 N.

Y. 588.
The other line of decisions exclude the theory of contract or cuty
(r866), 53 Pa.512; Phila. &- Reading arising out of contract, and place the
R. R. v. Derby (1852), 14 How.(55 U. liability on the ground of the servS.) 468; Seymour v.Greenwood(1861), ant acting within the scope of his em7 Hurl., Nor. 354; Mloore v. Fitch- ployment; the rule being, if the servant
committed the assault, or tortious act,
R. R. (1855),4 Gray (Mass.)
burg,etc.,
within the line of his employment, the
465; Weed v. Panama R. Co. (1858),
R. v. master was held liable, and if he did
17 N. Y. 362; Mlilwaukee, etc.,
Finney (i86o), IO Vis. 388; Quigley not so commit it, the master was not
liable. The difficulty was in determinv.CenralPac. R. Co. (1876) ii Nev.
350; Malecek v. Tower Grove R. R. ing what was, and what was not, within
Co. (1874), 57 Mo. 18; Hanson v. the servant's line of duty, and this has
R. R. Co. (1873) 62 been the trouble since the case of MacEuropean, etc.,
manus v. Cricket (18oo), I East 103,
Me. 84; Pendleton v.Ainsley (1871),
which introduced the rule. The jurisU. S. C. Ct., Dist. R. I., 3 Cliff. 416;
R. Co.(I876), dictions which hold the carrier liable,
Rounds v. Delaware,etc.,
64 N. Y. 129; Shea v. Sixth 4ve. R. on the ground of contract, or duty, must
Co. (1875), 62 Id.i8o; Cohen v. Dry necessarily reject this ru!e, and it is not
Dock Co. (1877), 69 Id. 170; Stewart applicable to innkeepers, nor, in Pennv.Brooklyn, etc., R. R. (1882), 90 Id. sylvania (Rommnel v. Schamnbach,r
(1887), 126 Pa., 582; S. C. 27 At R.
588; Ramnsden v.Boston & 41b. R. R.
LAW REG. 156) to saloons or places
(1870), 104 Mass. 117; Teire Haute
and IndianapolisR. R. Co. v.Jackson open to the public, and, by the decision in the principal case, not applicable
(1882), 81 Ind. i9; Wabash and .
Louis R. R. v. Rector (1882), 104 Ill. to depot companies. Where the doctrine
296; Lynch v. Mret. Elevated R. R. prevails, the decisions attempted to de(1882), 90 N. Y. 77; Louisville, etc.,fine the rule, some stating the test to be
the answer to the question "Was the
R. R. v. Kelly (1883), 92 Ind. 371;
R. R. v. Kenle servant acting for his own purpose, or
International, etc.,
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the purposes, or behalf of the company? "-and others that "If the servant has the power to do the act, the
master is responsible for the manner in
-which it was done,"-as, for instance,
having the power to eject a passenger
from the car, the carrier was held responsible, if the ejection was improper
andunlawful: Indanapolis,etc. R.R. v.
Anthony (1873), 43 Ind. 183; as ejection on a false charge, on improper
grounds and abuse of the power:
Ramsden v. Boston & Ab. R. R.
(I870), 104 Mass. 117; Higgins v.
Watervliet, etc., R. R. (1871), 46 N. Y.
8
23; Passenger .R. R. v. Young.(1 7),
21 Ohio St. 5I8; Beddinov. South Carolina R. R. (1871), 3 S. C. I; Schultze
v. ThirdAve. (I88o), 46 N.Y. Super. Ct.
211. On the other hand, the carrier was
held not liable for the assault upon a
passenger, by a brakeman: Evansville
R. R2.v. Raz,, (x866), 26 Ind. 70; nor
for the driver of the car knocking a
small boy from the platform: Piltsburg,
etc., R. .R. v. Donahue (1871), 70 Pa.
119; because in the former case the
brakeman was not pursuing his duties
;s a brakeman when he committed the
assault, that is, he did not assault the
passenger while in the act of turning or.
regulating the brakes; and in the latter
,case, because the driver's line of duty
was to drive and not to put any one off
the car.
In the jurisdictions which hold the
carrier liable on the ground of contract,
,or duty, arising from contract, the identical facts in Evansville R. R. v. Baut
o
(1866), 26 Ind. 7 ,and Piltsburg, etc.,
2. R. v. Donahue (1871), 70 Pa. 119,
-were sufficient to hold the carrier liable:
Chicago,etc., R. R. v. Flexman (1882),
103 11L 546. The reason of the conflict
is that two different principles have been
invoked, one following the doctrine of
duty, and the other respaondeatsuperior;
.one, that it is a duty, which the law imposes and'the principal cannot shirk, and

is therefore liable, whether he performs
the duty personally, or delegates it to
another; and the other depends upon
the fact, whether the servant acted within
the scope of his employment.
If it could be generally affirmed that
a master is liable for the acts of his servant, tortious or contractural, while doing
the business with which he is entrusted
there would not occur so much trouble.
The servant, quoadthe business, is the
master during the transaction of that
business, as, for instance, the brakeman
of the train represents the master during the whole trip, and whether he acts
as brakeman, conductor, porter or car
sweeper, the passenger and third persons have the right to hold the principal,
present and acting in the person of the
brakeman, and doing in all respects that
which the principal would do if present.
It is very narrow judgment to split such
business up into as many divisions as the
servant wishes, making one port the acts
of the master, and the other part only
binding on the servant; as, forinstance,
where the conductor stopped the train
and took up the plaintiff's child: Gilliam v. South, etc., R. R. (I88I), 70
Ala. 268; or set fire to the child:
Cooley 68; it was held that the master
was not liable. It was the servant's act,
outside of the line of his duty to his
master.
The distinction is too small. The
master put into the hands of the servant
the means by which the wrong was
committed. He hired the wrong servant. If the master had been in charge
of the train, or if he had hired a careful and proper servant, the train would
not have stopped and the assault would
not have been committed, nor the child
fired. Hence, because he failed in his
duty, by hiring the wrong servant, the
master is exempt from liability for the
wrongs his servant commits.
The objection is not directed to the
substance of the doctrine, but to the
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statement of it. If properly defined and
properly applied, it is believed to be in
perfect accord with the doctrine of
duty. Take the case which first laid
down the rule: lfacnanus v. Cricket
(i8oo), I East io3, and ask the question, which is the more sensible, to'
say that having put the servant in charge
of a vehicle to drive to a certain place,
the master is liable for all the acts of
the servant while so driving the vehicle,
because be is put there by the master
to perform a duty which the master was
bound to do; namely, to drive - the
vehicle and conduct himself so as not
to do injury to another; or to say that
the master is not liable, because the
servant, instead of going on the direct
road to do the business with which he
was entrusted, went in a roundabout
way and committed the wrong complained of. In the former case, the
master is liable, because it was his dity
to so use'his property as notto injure another, whether he drove the vehicle
himself, or entrusted the driving to his
servant; and in the latter case, the
question of route is the criterion.
Holding a master responsible for the
willful wrong of the servant, is an infringement of the natural and primitive
rule that man, being rational, is individually responsible for his own wrongs,
and that one man should not suffer for
the wrongs and sins of another. The
term wrong, means willful, such as assaults and not negligence, or injuries
resulting from want of care. This impingement was made for public policy,
in the law of innkeepers, and applied
Io the doctrine of respondeat superior,
and the other branches above mentioned,
but, because the principle for the impingement is nowhere advanced, and
nowhere affirmed, the decisions have
oscillated to and fro. That the principle above contended for, is the true and
proper one, is supported by the reasoning and discussions of the following

cases : Phila. & Reading R. R. v.
Derby (I852), 14 How. (55 U. S.) 468;
Phdadelphia, etc., R. R. v. Quigfley
(1858), 2x How. (62 U. S.) 202; 7oore
v. Fitchburg, etc., R. R. (1855),4 Gray.
Mass. 465 ; Pennsylvania,etc., R. .R. v.
VanDcver(1862),42Pa.365;Pittsburg,
etc., R. R. v. Shsser (1869), 29 Ohio,
St. 157; Atlantic, etc., R. R. v. .Dunn
(1869), Id. 162; Daltonv. Beers (187),
38 Conn. 529; Hokinsv. Atlantic, dc.,
R. R. (1857), 36 N. H. 9; Baltimore,
etc., R. R. v. Blocher (1867), 27 Md.
277; Hansonv. EnropeanR.R.(i873 ),
62 Me. 84; Nw Orleans, etc., R. R. v.
B-urst (1859), 36 Miss. 66o; Sherlcyv.
Billings (1871), 8 Bush. (Ky.) 147;
17'ralecek v. Tower Grove 1?.R. (1874),
27 Mo. i8; Goddardv. Grand Trunk
Ry. (1869), 57 Me. 202, Brand v.
Schenectady,etc., R. R. (1850), 8 Barb.,
N. Y., 368; Seymour v. Greenwood
(1861), 7 Hurl. &Nor. 354; M7filwaukee
R. R. v. Finney (186o), 10 'Wis. 388;
Pittsburg,etc., R. R. v. Hinds (I46,),
53 Pa. 512; Weed v. Panana R. R.
(1858), 17 N. Y. 362; Flint v. Transjportation Co. (1868), 34 Conn. 362;
Landreauv.Bell (1833),5 La. (0. S.)
434; Chamberlainv. Chandler(1823),
U.S. C. Ct., Dist. Mass., 3 Mason 242;
iVieto v. Clark (1858), U. S. C. Ct., Dist.
Mass., I Cliff. 145. -

About the best discussion is found
in Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry.
(I869), 57 Me. 202; and the conclusion reached was that it was the
duty of the carrier to protect the
passenger against violence and insults of strangers, co-passengers and
servants, and--" If this duty ii not performed and this protection not furnished,
but on the contrary, the passenger is,
assaulted and insulted * * by the
carrier's servant, the carrier is responsible." The same conclusi6n is reached
in Rounds v. Delaware, etc., R. R.
(1876), 64 N. Y. 137, thQugh the reasoning is laborious and not close; the
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Court stated that the master who puts
the servant in a place to do the master's
business, is responsible for what the
servant does through lack of judgment,
or discretion, or from infirmity of
temper, or under the influence of passion, beyond the strict line of his duty
or authority and inflicts an unjustifiable
injury upon another. This reasoning
was followed in Cohen v. Dry Dock
Co. (1877), 6o N. Y. 17o . The same
line of argument was advanced in
Craker v. Chicago R. R. (1875), 36
Wis. 657; and in the cases there cited,
where the Court said that it would be
cheap and superficial morality to allow
one owing a duty to another, to commit the performance of this duty to a
third person, and be exempt from responsibility for the malicious conduct
of the substitute.
The reasoning in Crakerv. Chicago
etc., R.R. (1875), 36 Wis. 657; is well
enforcedby the casecited in the opinion.
The same reasoning and doctrine were
advanced in Stewart v. Brooklyn, elc.,
R. R. (1882), 90 N. Y. 588; which re-

pudiates some earlier cases, among
them Isaac v. The Third Avenue R. R.
('1871), 47 N. Y. 122, and which follows Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. R.
(1869), 57 Me. 202, and Craker v.
Chicago, etc., R. R. (1875), 36 Wis..
657; and the line cf cases advanced
to support the doctrine stated hy the
writer. The argument advanced in
Isaacs v. The Third Avenue R. R.
(1871), 47 N. Y. 122, is the same as
that found in Parker v. Erie, etc., ?.
R. (1875), 5 Hun. (N. Y.) 57; Little
AT.R. R. v. Wetmore (1869), 19 Ohio
St. hio; Ward v.Omnibus Co. (1873),
42 L. J. C. P. 265; Evansville v.
Baum (1866), 26 Ind. 70; Great
Western R. R. v. lMiller (1869), 19
Mich. 305; Priestv. Hudson River R.
R. (1871), 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 456;
Johnson v. Chicago, etc., R. R. (1882),
58 Iowa 348; and has not that weight
of reason and logic in support which
are contained in the other cases.
JNo. F.'KELLY.
St. Paul, Minn.

Supreme Court of Texas.
INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA
V.

EASTON

ET AL.

A warranty in a tolicy of fire insurance, that "this insurance shall not inure to
the benefit of any carrier," does not contravene public policy, nor is it in restraint
of trade.
Although a stipulation in a bill of lading, which gives the carrier the benefit of
any insurance upon the goods carried, is valid, and, in case of loss, will defeat the
insurer's right of subrogation, the insured, by entering into such a contract, forfeits
all rights under a policy containing a warranty that the insurance shall not inure to
the benefit of any carrier, nor can a carrier acquire any rights under such a policy.
It is immaterial, in such case, that the contract of insurance was made witholt
the carrier's knowledge or privity.

Appeal from District Court, Galveston County.
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Action by Nelson S. Easton and' others, Receivers of the
Houston & Texas Central Railway Company, against the Insurance Company of North America. Judgment for plaintiffs,
and defendant appeals.
Hume & .Kleberg,for appellant.
Willie, Maott & Ballinger,for appellees.
STAYTON, C. J., March I, 1889.

This case comes before us

on an agreed statement, made from the record, and signed by

counsel, which is as follows:
On the 22d day of June, 1885, appellant, a corporation having
its domicile in the State of Pennsylvania, issued an open policy
to Callender & Magnus, cotton buyers, residing in New York
City. This policy was renewed September I, 1886, for one
year, subject to certain conditions and the following express
warranty: "Warranted that this insurance shall not inure to
the benefit of any carrier." Under the terms of the open policy
all cotton purchased by Callender & Magnus, or by their agents
for them, in the United States, was at once covered by the
same as soon as purchased, they reporting as soon as practicable to the insurance company the particulars of the purchase,
as to marks, value, amount of insurance desired, etc. The
insurance company would then issue to Callender & Magnus
a certificate of insurance, giving date from which insurance
began, number of bales insured, amount of insurance, locality
of cotton, and its intended route of shipment. But the insurance as such was complete under the said open policy as soon
as the cotton was purchased, even before the certificate was
issued; the certificate being only a statement giving the details
of the particular transaction, such as value, amount insured,
and route of shipment, but without in any manner altering or
modifying the terms and conditions of the open policy, or the
conditions and Warranty contained in the aforesaid renewal
thereof. The purpose of an open policy is convenience to the
assurad, and to insure his property from the very moment of
its acquisition. This could not be done if he was required to
make a separate contract for each lot of cotton which he may
purchase in different parts of the country. The danger and
risk which would necessarily intervene after the purchase is
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made until insurance could be effected by special policy, would
have to be borne by the owner. Upon the open policy, however, the owner is protected by the insurance upon all purchases, no matter where and when made, and though loss
should occur before report of the purchase to the insurer, or
issuance of the certificate of insurance. Premiums under the
policy in this case were payable monthly upon amounts insured
thereunder for that period.
On the 9 th day of December, 1886, Callender & Magnus, by
one of their agents, bought and became the owners of fifty bales
of cotton at Mexia, Tex. The advice of this purchase reached
the office of the appellant insurance company some time thereafter, and said company, on the I6th of said month, issued to
Callender & Magnus a certificate of insurance. The certificate
provides that it represented and took the place of the policy,
and conveyed all the rights of the original policy-holder (for
the purpose of collecting any loss or claim) as fully as if the
property was covered by a special policy direct to the holder
of the certificate, and the certificate was dated New York, December 16, 1886.
On the IIth day of December, 1886, Callender & Magnus,
by their agents, delivered to appellees, who are common carriers, at the town of Mexia, Tex., to be shipped to Liverpool,
England, the said fifty bales of cotton, and on the same day
appellees delivered to the said agents of Callender & Magnus
a bill of lading containing, among other things, the following
provision"In case ot any loss, detriment, or damage done to, or sustained by, any of the
property herein receipted for during such transportation, whereby any legal liability
shall or may be incurred, that company alone shall be answerable therefor in whose
actual custody the same be at the time of the happening of such loss, detriment, or
damage, and the carrier so liable shall have full benefit of any insurance that may
have been effected upon or on account of said cotton."

On the 12th day of December, 1886, while said cotton was
in the custody of appellees, in their capacity as common carriers, forty bales thereof, of the value of $ 1,725.34, were totally
destroyed by fire. The appellant was notified of the destruction of the cotton December 21, 1886. When the appellant
issued the certificate of insurance to Callender & Magnus it
VOL. XXXVIII.- 3
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had no notice or knowledge of that clause in the bill of lading
which provides that the carrier of said cotton shall have the
benefit of any insurance which may have been effected upon or
on account of said cotton. The fact that such clause was contained in said bill of lading was first brought to the knowledge
of appellant when the bill of lading was presented to it, as one
of the proofs of loss required, some time after the 21st of December, I886. Appellees had no actual notice of the warranty
in the policy stipulating that the. insurance should not inure tothe benefit of any carrier, and, being liable for the loss of the
cotton as common carriers, paid the same, whereupon Callender & Magnus transferred to them the certificate of insuranceAppellant declined to pay the policy to Callender & Magnus
because the same had been forfeited by their acceptance of the
bill of lading. Appellant declining to pay for the loss, appellees, on the 27th of September, 1887, sued it in the District
Court of Galveston county. That Court held the clause in the
policy, providing that the instrument shall not inure to the
benefit of any carrier, to be void, because in restraint of trade
and against public policy, and rendered judgment for appellees
for

I,725.34.

From this judgment the Insurance Company

of North America appeals, and the following questions of law,
embraced in the assignments of error, are now by agreement
respectfully submitted to this Court for its decision: (I) Is the
warranty in the policy, which provides that the insurance shall
not inure to the benefit of any carrier, a valid and lawful stipulation in the contract of insurance, and does a violation thereof
forfeit the policy, or is said warrantk in restraint of trade and
contrary to public policy? (2) Under the particular facts of
this case, irrespective of any rights which Callender & Magnus
may have had under the contract of insurance, can appellees
under the law recover against the appellant?
It must now be held that so much of the clause in the bill
of lading as provided that "the carrier so liable shall have full
benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon or
on account of said cotton," is not invalid by reason of its contravening any rule based on public policy: Insurance Co. v.
Railway Co. (I885), 63 Tex. 475; Insurance Co. v. Transportation Co. (I886), 117 U. S. 312; 4zrnan v. Railway Co. (1889),
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129 U. S. 128; Rintoul v. Railroad Co. (1883), U. S. Circ. Ct.,
S. Dist. N. Y., 17 Fed. Repr. 905 ; Platt v. RailroadCo. (I888),
io8 N. Y. 358; Jackson Co. v. Insurance Co. (1885), 139 Mass.
508. In the case first referred to, the bill of lading was prior,
in point of time, to the policy, which recited the fact of shipment, and it was held that this was sufficient evidence that the
policy was issued, with notice of the right secured by the carrier by contract, and in subordination to that right. The same
ruling was made in the second case cited, in which it is assumed that the contracts of carriage and insurance were made
simultaneously, the insurer being ignorant of the clause in the
bill of lading which subrogated the carrier to the rights of shipper under the policy. In disposing of the case the Court said"The policy containing no express stipulation upon the subject, and there being
no evidence of any fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation by the owner in
obtaining the insurance, the existence of the stipulation between the owner and
the carrier would have afforded no defense to an action on the policy, according to
the careful judgments rendered in June last, and independently of each other,the one by the English Court of Appeal, and the other by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts: Tale v. HZ)'slo (1885), L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 368; Jackson Co. v. Insurance Co. (I885), 139 Mlass. 508."

In Iunan v. Railway Co., supra, it appeared that the policy
issued some time before the shipment was made, and, while
recognizing the validity of a contract between the shipper and
carrier, whereby the latter should become entitled to the benefit of insurance made by the former in a proper case, the
Court said"The policies here were all taken out some weeks before the shipments were
made, although, of course, they did not attach until then, and recovery upon
neither of them could have been had, except upon condition of resort over against
the carrier, any act of the owners to defeat which operated to cancel the liability
of the insurers. They could nottherefore, be made available for the benefit of
the carrier."

In Jackson Co. v. Insurance Co., supra,it was assumed that
the carrier might contract for the benefit of insurance secured
by the shipper, and the inference to be drawn from the report
of the case is, that the policy, made the basis of the action,
was issued after the right of the carrier to the benefit of insurance had attached. The shipper bought through a broker,
who it seems did not read the receipts securing to the carrier
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the benefit of insurance. The railroad's receipt, with draft attached, was forwarded by the broker to the shipper, the draft
cashed, notice given to the insurance company of the shipments, and the policy presented, that the shipment might be
evidenced thereon, which was done. This seems to have been
the act which applied the insurance to the cotton destroyed
while in transit, and no inquiry was made as to the terms of
shipment when insurance was thus obtained. In disposing of
the case the Court said" That the contract between the plaintiff and the carrier was binding and valid
being conceded, we are brought to the conclusion expressed in the ruling of the
Judge who presided at the trial, ' that in a case where there was no intention to
deprive the insurance company of its rights, and no intentional fraud and concealment, and where the plaintiff (shipper) was actually ignorant of the stipulation relied on at the time it made the insurance or obtained the indorsement on the policy,
and was ignorant, when it ordered the cotton, that any such stipulation would be
made, and there was no actual misrepresentation, an insurance company insuring
property in transilu, making no provision in regard to the nature of the contract
of carriage, and not requesting to see the bill of lading or receipt, and making no
inquiries about them, must be held to have insured it under and subject to the actual contract of carriage, so far as it was a lawful contract.'"

Under this state of facts it was held that the carrier, by
virtue of its contract, became subrogated to all rights held by
the shipper against the insurer; and that thus was defeated
the right of the insurer to be subrogated, on payment of the
loss, to the right against the carrier, to which, but for the contract of shipment, the insurer, under the settled principles of
law, would have been entitled. This case, while holding that
the right of the insured, when dependent only on his relation
to the carrier, to modify by contract the rule of subrogation,
cannot be questioned, concedes that no contract made between
the insured and the insurer, whereby the right to modify the
general rule of subrogation is withdrawn from the insured,
can be controlled by a contract between the insured and the
the carrier.
In Insurance Co. v. Calebs (1859), 20 N. Y. 175, it was held
that a contract between a carrier and shipper, substantially
such as is set up in this case, was valid; and on payment of a
loss under a policy issued after the contract for carriage was
made, the right of subrogation was denied to the insurer. In
disposing of the case the Court said-
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"It is argued that this clause in the contract did not exempt the carrriers from
liability to the plaintiffs, because it was made without their knowledge or consent,
and was an attempted fraud upon their rights. But this is not so in point of fact,
so far as the defendants are concerned. The contract between them and the insured was made before any insurance was obtained; and though it sought to
secure a right to the defendants in case policies were procured, yet on their part
no fraud was contemplated on the plaintiffs,-none is found by the Court. It is
true the case states that the plaintiffs did not know of the contract when they issued their policies. That was a matter between them and the insured. If there
was any fraudulent concealment of facts on the part of the latter at the time they
obtained their insurances, it would have avoided the policies, and they would not
have been bound to pay the loss. If they paid it voluntarily, they are not entitled
to be subrogated."

In this case, as in the others, but one, considered, there was
no contract between the insured and insurer, at the time the
contract between the carrier and the insured was made, which
restrained them from modifying or entirely annulling the ordinary rule of subrogation if they saw proper to do so by
contract.
The cases referred to hold: (I) That contracts, such as
contained in the carrier's contract before us, are valid as between the carrier and shipper. (2) That a policy issued with
knowledge that the insured property is in transit, in the absence of inquiry as to the terms of shipment, misrepresentation as to this or other matter material to the risk, or fraud,
will be deemed to have been issued in subordination to the
contract of shipment, which may control the right of the
insurer to subrogation. None of them, however, hold that
a contract of insurance, existing when a contract of carriage is made, whether the carrier have knowledge of the insurance contract or not, can be controlled by a subsequent
contract between the insured and the carrier, and the insurer's
right to subrogation thus be destroyed, even when there is no
express provision in the policy which forbids this. It must
be that, in the absence of stipulation in a policy to the contrary, the insured may, without invalidating his policy, make
such contracts with a carrier, limiting the liability of the latter, as may be lawful under the laws in force at the place of
shipment, or such other laws as may be applicable; for the
parties ought to be presumed to contract with reference to the
right of the carrier to refuse to receive and transport freight
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without contract, limiting his liability in so far as this may
lawfully be done under the law governing the shipment. With
the carrier's liability lawfully restricted by contract, a loss resulting from a cause within the restriction would not give
right of action in favor of the insured shipper against the carrier; and where this is the case there can be no subrogation
under the general principles applicable to the subject.
The contract relied on by the carrier in this case was not
,one it had the right to have made, or otherwise the right to
refuse to receive cotton for transportation; and it ought not to
be presumed that the parties to the insurance contract contemplated that the affreightment would be made practically at the
entire risk of the insurer, when the carrier had no right to insist that this should be so, and when the. general rules of law,
with reference to which they ought to be presumed to have
contracted, fix on the carrier the ultimate liability for a loss
,occurring while the freight is in his hands, unless the loss
arises from a cause that relieves the carrier from liability. The
carrier's liability is held to be the ultimate liability, simply
because the loss of property, while in his custody as carrier,
results in fact or in legal contemplation from his failure of
duty, while that of the insurer is held to be that only of an
indemnitor, in all cases in which the insurance contract does
not stipulate to the contrary, or in which a contrary instruction may not fairly be inferred from the time and circumstances
of the contract. It seems to us, under the facts of this case,
leaving out of consideration the warranty contained in the
contract of insurance, that the right of the insurer to subrogation on payment of the loss is as well secured when there is
not, as well as when there is, an express contract that the right
to subrogation shall exist; and that a contract between the insured and the carrier which defeats this right would defeat the
right of the insured or the carrier to recover at all upon the
contract of insurance. It has been held that, where a policyexpressly gives the insurer the right to subrogation against
the carrier, a subsequent agreement between the insured and
the carrier that the latter shall be subrogated to the right of
the insured avoids the policy: Carstairsv. Izsurance Co. (1883),
U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Md., 18 Fed. Repr. 473. The correctness
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of this ruling was recognized in Jackson Co. v. Insurance Co.
(i 885), 139 Mass. 51I. If the insured wishes insurance that will
place the ultimate liability on the insurer, let him so make his
contract as to protect the carrier afterwards to be selected by
them; compensate the insurer for the increased risk of ultimate
loss; and be in position to contract with the carrier for reduction in freight, such as may be proper by reason of this shifting
of the ultimate risk of loss from the carrier to the insurer.
Passing from this, however, it is certainly true that the insured could not confer on the carrier a right he did not possess. The warranty which the insurance company seeks to
assert to avoid liability to the carrier was one promissory in
character, in which the parties contracted "that this insurance
shall not inure to the benefit of any carrier." This, if a valid
-provision, cuts off any construction of the policy whereby it
could possibly be held to confer any right to benefit under
it on a carrier of the property insured, and it deprives the insured of the power to confer on such carrier any right to benelit under the policy by contract or otherwise. By the warranty
we understand the parties to have contracted that the contract
of insurance should be avoided-should cease to be operative
-if during the time specified for its continuance the insured
should so contract with a carrier of the property insured as,
between themselves, to give to the carrier any right to benefit
under the policy. The purpose of this provision evidently
was to deny, in terms, to the insured the right of power to
confer on the carrier any right to benefit through the policy,
such as the cases to which we have referred hold may be conferred on the carrier by contract with the shipper made before
insurance is obtained. The insurer, in effect, says in the face
of the policy,-and to this the insured assents" This contract shall be binding on me only so long as you refrain from contracting with any carrier you may employ to transport the insured property that
he shall have right to any indemnity from me for loss occurring, while the prop-erty is in his possession as carrier, from a cause which, under the rules of law applicable to the contract of carriage, would give you cause of action against such
carrier; and I will not be longer bound by this contract if you in any manner
release such carrier from that full liability to you and to me which will exist under
a lawful contract of affreightment for loss of the insured property while in his
baands as carrier."
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By requiring the carrier's liability to continue the ultimate
liability, the insurer doubtless intended to make the carrier's
own interest some guaranty against its own negligence or misconduct. In the very act of making the contract through
which the carrier in this case claims, the policy ceased to be
of any effect whatever, as to the particular cotton at least, and
from that time forward neither the insured nor the carrier
could assert a right under it, based on the particular loss, if
the warranty was valid.
The Court below held that the warranty was invalid, because in restriction of trade, and against public policy. The
insurance company was under no legal obligation to issue a
policy at all, but, if it did, it had the right to place a provision
in the policy such as it did, and in so doing it neither contravened any public policy nor restrained trade. It is said that
the carrier had no notice of the clause in the policy now relied
upon, and that for this reason it would be contrary to public
policy to permit it now to rely upon the warranty. The law
does not require that notice shall be given to third persons of
contracts of insurance, nor does it provide a mode in which
such notice may be given whereby all persons will be bound.
If the want of notice of a contract become important in a contest between a party to it and a third person, who has sought
to acquire by contract an interest or right antagonistic to the
right the former contract gives, it is not because the former
contract was illegal, but because some .equitable consideration
has arisen on account of which the person who has kept secret
his right ought not to be permitted to assert, it against one
whom he has misled by his silence. If the mere want of
notice of contracts would place them on the list of contracts
condemned because contrary to public policy, then there would
be a long list of condemned contracts, not heretofore even
suspected of illegality. The carrier knew that no right could
be acquired against the insurer through a contract with the
insured other than the latter possessed and had power to convey, and if it desired to know the extent of that right it was
its duty to inquire. Appellee makes this inquiry: " Could
the insurance company and the owner of the cotton, without
the knowledge or privity of the carrier, make a contract be-
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tween themselves by which the carrier would be deprived of
its well-recognized legal rights ? Is not such a restriction
against public policy, and in restraint of trade?" Neither the
knowledge of nor privity of the carrier to the insurance contract was necessary to its legality. The carrier had no legal
right, recognized or unrecognized, to.have the insurance
company or the insured to make any contract of insurance
whatever, much less to make one the insurance company was
under no obligation to make, and had refused to make. The
terms of the policy neither restrained appellee nor any other
carrier from making lawful contracts for carriage at any place,
nor from carrying them out anywhere; they simply denied to
the insured the right to make a contract which would bind the
insurer as the carrier desired it to be bound.
Two further inquiries and suggestions are made by appellee:
"Then, knowing the law,-knowing that the carrier had the
right to stipulate for the benefit of any insurance that may
have been effected,-knowing that the shipper could not refuse
to accept from th carrier a bill of lading with that provision,
-will appellant be permitted to receive premiums, and at the
same time insert a clause in its policy of insurance which
would exonerate it from the payment of any loss ?" "Appellant refused to pay the policy to Callender & Magnus because
the same had been forfeited by their acceptance of the bill of
lading. This excuse might have had some force if they had
any option, but it was the law of Texas and the United States.
that the carrier had the right to issue such a bill of lading.
Callender & Magnus had no right to refuse to receive it." Appellant, corporation though it is, is affected with knowledge of
the law; but, admitting this, we think it cannot be charged
with knowledge that the propositions here made are the law.
It knew that the carrier might stipulate for the benefit of such
insurance as the insured had the power and right to convey;
but it did not know that the insured and carrier might make a
contract for it without its consent, and contrary to the express
stipulation of the policy. We think it did not know that the
shipper had not the right to.reject the bill of lading on which
appellee now bases its right, containing the clause in regard to
insurance; for we understand it was the right of the shipper
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to reject that bill of lading, and to have their cotton transported on one that did not contain that provision. A refusal
to give the carrier the benefit of insurance already secured,
would be, in effect, but a refusal to insure for the benefit of the
carrier, and this a carrier cannot require as a condition on which
it will receive and transport freight. If there be any question
of unearned premium, it is not presented in this case. The
policy having ceased to be operative, and that being the
foundation of all obligation on the part of the insurance
,company, the certificates subsequently issued, and transferred
subsequently to the loss, conferred no right on the carrier.
The judgment of the Court below will be reversed, and judgiment here rendered for appellant.
It is so ordered.
The consideration of the principal
-case involves at least four different questions: (i) The insurer's right of subrogation. (2) The insurable interest of
-the carrier. (3) The effect of a stipulation that the carrier shall have the
b nefit of the owner's insurance upon
goods consigned. (4) The effect of a
warranty in the policy that the insurance
shall not inure to the benefit of any
-carrier.
I. The iunszrer'.s rightof subrogation.
.- It maybe accepted as settled law that
an insurer, upon payment of a loss,
"'
becomes subrogated to all the assured's
rights of action against third persons
who have caused, or are responsible
for, the loss. No express stipulation in
the policy of insurance, or abandonment
by the assured, is necessary to perfect
the title of the insured. From the very
nature of the contract, the insurer, when
he ha. paid to the assured the amount
of the indemnity agreed on between
them, is entitled, by way of salvage, to
the benefit of anything that may be received, either from the remnants of the
goods, or from damages paid by third
persons for the same loss :" .Phrnix
in. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co.

(1886), 117 U. S.312; s.c.,

25 AMER.
LAW REG. 330. "It is, as a general
principle, true," says DEvE,S, J.,in
Jackson Co. v. .Ooylston Mitt. -is. Co.
(885), 139 Mass. 508, "that, if goods
are injured by transportation under such
circumstances that the carrier and the
insurer are alike liable therefor, and the
insurer pays for such injury, he will be
subrogated to such claim as the owner
may have against the carrier. And this,
apparently, because the liability of the
carrier is treated as primary, while that
of the insurer is secondary only. The
contract of insurance being one of indemnity, the insurer, when he has indemnified the insured, is equitably entitled to succeed to the right which he
had against the carrier."
The general principle stated in these
cases was long since recognized in England in the cases of Randalv. Cockran
(1748), 1 Ves. Sr. 98; .ifason v. Sainrbury (782), 3 Doug. 61; Clark v. Inhabitantsof Blything (1823), 2 B. & C.
254; Yates v. Vhyte (1838), 4 Bing.
N, C. 272. Following the English decisions, Chief Justice SHAW held, in
Hart v. Western R. R. Corporation
(1847), 13 Met. (Mass.) 99, that an in-
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occasioned by sparks negligently communicated to the insured property from
a railroad company's locomotive, was
subrogated to the insured's right of recovery against the railroad. The principle was again applied by Chief Justice
GIBSON, in Gales v. Hailman (1849),
Ix Pa. 515, to the case of goods lost
-while in the custody of a common carrier. In both of these cases it was held
that the action must be in the name of
the shipper, who, to the extent of the
indemnity received by him from his insurance, sues as trustee for the insurer.
The carrier cannot set up the payment
made by the insurer, as satisfaction, in
-whole or in part, of the claim, nor can
he call upon the insurer for contribution.
These decisions were followed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of goods destroyed by accidental fire, while in course of transportation by a common carrier: Hall v.
Vashville &I C. R. R. Co., 13 Wall. (80
U. S.) 367, where the right of the insurer
to subrogation, admitted on the argument to prevail in cases of marine insurance, was held to apply equally to
cases of fire insurance upon land. The
general principle was again recognized
in The Potomac (183I), 1O5 U. S. 630 ,
and in Liverpool& G. W Steam Co. v.
-PhenixLis. Co. (1889), 129 Id. 397.
In England the early decisions have
been consi.tently followed: White v.
Dobinson (1844), 14 Sim. 273; Dickenson v. Jardine (i868), L. R. 3 C. P.
639; Simpsoz v.Th omson (1877),L. R.
3 App. Cas. 279; Quebec FireAssr. Co.
v. St. Louis (1851), 7 Mo. P. C. 286;
-Darrellv. Tibbitts (188o), L. R. 5 Q.
B. D. 56o. The two cases last cited
arose out of contracts of fire insurance.
Other cases in which the doctrine of
subrogation has been recognized as applying to rights of action against wrongdoers, for damages done to property
which is the subject of insurance, are :

Rockingham A.Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Bosher (1855), 39 Me. 253; Bean v.
Atlantic 6- St. L. .R. R. Co. (1870), 58
Id. 82; Connecticut Afut. Life Ins. Co.
v. New York &" N H. R. R. Co. (1856),
25 Conn. 265; Peoria t&'
.
F. Ins. Co.
v. Frost(1865), 37 Ill. 333; Afonmouth
County Afut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson (1870), 21 N. J. Eq. 107; Connec-

ticutFire Ins. Co. v. ErieRy.Co. (1878),
73 N. Y. 399; Platt v. Richmond,Y
R. & C. R. R. Co. (1888), roS Id. 358;
Swarhout v. Chicago &WRy. Co.
W.
(i88o), 49 Vis. 625; HustisfordFarmers' .11ft. Ins. Co. V. Chicago, Af. &- St.
P. Ry. Co. (1886), 66 Id. 58. The only
case which denies subrogation to the
insurer is Carrollv.New Orleans,_T 6G. N. R. R. Co. (1874), 26 La. An. 447,
which was the decision of a divided
Court, and has not been reaffirmed.
The facts of that case were very similar
to those of the principal case, the action
being against a common carrier for the
-value of cotton destroyed by fire while
in transit. In his dissenting opinion,
TALIAFERRO, J., says: "I am clearly
of the opinion the insurance company
stands subrogated by law to all the rights
of the owners against the carriers, as
they certainly are upon general principles of equity." In the case of Hartford Ins. Co. v. Pennell(1878), 2 Bradw.
(Ill.) 609, the Court went so far as to
restrain the insured, at the suit of the
insurers, who had paid him the loss,
from making a settlement of his claim
against the alleged wrong-doer.
When the insurer, by reason of
the payment of the loss, has become
subrogated to the rights of the insured,
he may recover, in a suit against the
carrier, brought in the name of the insured, the full amount of the loss or
damage, without regard to the amount
of the policy of insurance: Alobile &'
il. R.R. Co. v. Jirey (1883), III U.S.
584. And in such a suit the carrier
cannot defend on the ground that the
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insurer has failed to interpose a defense,
which might have been successfully
made to the claim upon the policy:
Sun Mid. Ins. Co. v. Js~issiJiValley
Transp. Co. (U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Mo.,
1883), 17 Fed. Repr. 919.
2. Insurableinheresto] the carrier.A common carrier has an insurable interest in the goods carried for hire by
him: Bitchv.Clh'sap5ea/ei Is.Co.(I828),
i Pet. (26 U.S.) 151 ; Crowleyv. Cohen
(1832), 3 B. & Ad. 478; London 6N W Ry. Co. v. Glyn (1859), 1 E. &
E. 652; Van Natta v. JAt. Security
Ins. Co. (1849), 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 490;
Chase v. Tashington 2fit. Ins. Co.
(1852), 12 Barb. (N.Y.) 595; Savage
v. Corn Exchange Fire &- I N. Ins.
Co. (1858), i Bosw. (N. Y.) i ; Eastern
R.R. Co. v. Relief Fire his. Co. (1868),
98 Mass. 420; Commonwealth v. Hide
and Leather Ins. Co. (1873), 112 Id.
136; Jackson Co. v. Boylston Afut. hns.
Co. (1885), 139 Id. 5o8. "It is well
settled that an insurable interest, in mercantile language, does not necessarily
import an absolute right of property in
the thing insured. A special or qualified interest is equally the subject of
insurance; and it has often been determined that each distinct interest in the
same subject may be protected by a
separate policy on the subject, for the
party interested in it. The mortgagor
and mortgagee may both insure; so may
the trustee and the cestni yue trust; and
so may every party who has any special
interest to protect, or who repre'ents
the property as the qualified owner of
it:" De Forest v. Fulton Fire ns. Co.
(1828), 1 Hall (N. Y.) 84. This case,
in which the principles involved were
most elaborately considered and which
has always been recognized as a leading
authority, determined the right of a commission merchant to insure goods consigned to him for sale. But its reasoning is equally applicable to the case of
a carrier. Indeed, the carrier's interest

is greater than that of a commission.
merchant, for the carrier has not only a.
lien upon the goods for his transportation charge-, but he is absolutely liable,
as an insurer, to the owncr for their safe
delivery, unless destroyed by the act of
God or the enemy of the country:
Chase v. Washinglon Ma7ut Ins. Co.,
supra. If the carrier should recover
from the insurer an amount larger than
his interest in the goods, he would hold
the excess as trustee for the owner: De
For.st v. Ft/lon Fire Ins. Co., sitpra;
Wood on Fire Insurance, 514.
3. Effect of stipslationthatthe carriershallhave the benefit of the awnt r's
insurance.-Thefirst case in which the
effect of such a stipulation in a bill of
lading was considered, was Mfercantile
at. Ins. Co. v. Calebs (1859), 20 N. Y.
173, which is cited in the principal case.
This was a case of inland marine insurance. The underwriters brought suit
against the carriers for the value of
goods insured by the latter and lost
while in course of transportation, and
the carriers set up in defence to the action a stipulation in the bill of lading
giving them "the benefit of any insurance by or for account of" the owners
and insured. The Court (ALLEN, J.)
used the following language: "If there
had been no special agreement between
the insured and the defendants, under
the facts as found, the plaintiffs would
undoubtedly have been entitled to recover, if the defendants were liable for
the loss of the goods. * * * The question then arises, was the special contract
between the insured and the defendants
a valid one? and if so, what is its effect
upon the plaintiffs' right to recover? It
has been frequently decided that a common carrier may, by special contract,
limit, restrict, or modify, his common
law liability as an insurer of the transportation of goods. In the case of Gould
v. Hill (1842), 2 Hill (N. Y.) 623, a
majority of the Court held otherwise,
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but this Court, in Dorr v. New Jersey
Steal,, "az'. Co. (1854), II N.Y. 485,
held the contrary, and overruled the
-case of Gould v. Hill; and it had previously been repudiated in Parsons v.
Alonteath (85), 13 Barb. (N.Y.) 353,
and in Aloore v. Eval's (1852), 14 Id.
524 (see also Vew Jersey Steam Was'.
Co. v. Mferchants' B2ank (1848), 6 How.
(47 U.S.) 344). The Courtin all these
cases say that they see no reason why
parties may not contract as they please
in reference to the transportation of
goods; that such an agreement neither
changes nor interferes with any rule of
law, and does not affect public morals
or conflict with public interests. If the
owner chooses to take upon himself part
of the risk of transportation, and thereby
induces the carrier to convey for a less
rate of compensation, who has any right
to complain? It is a matter entirely
between themselves, unless it is the
result of a scheme to defraud third persons. It has long been determined, both
in England and in this country, that
such an agreement is valid and binding,
and in the absence of fraud can at all
times be enforced."
The general rule here stated so
broadly, although still followed in New
York, has not been recognized to its
full extent by other jurisdictions: Aew
York Cent. R.R.Co.v. Loe.kwood(I873),
17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 357; Ogdensburgy&
L. C. R. R. Co. v. Pratt(1874), 22 Id.
(89 U. S.) 123; Bank of Kentucly v.
Adams ExPress Co. (1876), 93 U. S.
174; Grand Trunk R'. of Canadav.
Stevens (1877), 95 Id. 655; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins.
Co. (1889), 129 Id. 397; Forepaugh
v. Delaware,L. & W R. R. Co. (1889),
24 W. N. C. (Pa.) 385. But the correctness of the ruling which sustained
contracts similar to that now under
consideration, has never been disputed.
In Rintoul v. Arew Yrk Cent. 6- H. R.
R. R. Co. (U. S. C. Ct., S. D. N. Y.,

et al.

1883), I7 Fed. Repr. 905; S. C., 21
Blatchf. 439, the same view of the law
was taken. This case was reported in
full in 23 A-tER. LAw REG. 294, with
a valuable annotation, in which the validity of such s'ipulations was discussed
at length. The annotator, in concluding, expresses some doubt as to whether
the rule there followed by Judge SHIPmAN was sound in principle or not. But
subsequent decisions have removed all
uncertainty from the question, and it
must now be regarded as accepted law.
In the year 1885 two cases were decided, one in Texas and one in Massachusetts, in each of which the validity
of the stipulation under discussion was
affirmed. In the former case, Brilisk
&' F. f. Ins. Co. v. Gulf, C. &, S. R
Rl).Co. (I885), 63 Tex. 475, it was said:
"The right to insert such a stipulation
as the present is universally admitted, or
denied, if at all, only on the ground of
the supposed effect it has of restricting
the common law liabil.ity of a carrier.
This, in our view, is not the effect of the
reservation. * * ir The right of the insurance company to recover against the
railroad company, if it existed at all, was
the result of an equitable subrogation to
the remedy of the owner of the cotton
against the carrier, and of the assignment
made subsequent to its loss. But the
assignment was worthless, as it was
made in privity and subordination to the
previous stipulation placed in the bill of
lading; and the subrogation was of no
avail, as no one can become subrogated
to a right which the party originally
possessing that right had previously contracted should not be enforced." In
the other case, Jackson Co. v. .Boylston
01tt. IIIs. Co. (1885), 139 Mass. 508,
the Massachusetts Court places its decision upon the following grounds: "As
the insurance company obtains its remedy against the carrier, not by virtue of
any contract of its own with him, but
through the contract of the owner of the
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goods, such owner may make the contract of carriage so as to suit his own
interest, provided there is no fraudulent
concealment from the insurer; and the
right which the insurer obtains is subject
to the agreement with the carrier. Carriers have an insurable interest in the
goods they transport, and may therefore
effect insurance ifpon them for their own
benefit. There is no reason why they
may not insure them jointly with the
owner, and, if so, why they may not
contract for the benefit of insurance
effected by the owner, in the absence of
fraud or any contract to the contrary
with the insurer. The owner is under
no obligation to contract so that he shall
have a remedy against the carrier under
every circumstance in which the carrier
has been held liable by the common
law. If he may accept a receipt excusing the carrier from liability from fire,
and still hold the insurer, he may also
make a contract that the insurance shall
be for the benefit of the carrier."
In the case just cited it was also held
that the insured's contract to give the
carrier the benefit of the insurance was
not in violation of a condition of his
policy, prohibiting the sale, assignment,
transfer or pledge of such policy, or the
interest insured thereby, without the
written consent of the insurer. 1"The
policy and interest in it are still retained
by the owner; it is neither transferred
nor pledged. There is a collateral
agreement only, that the carrier, having
incurred a liability, shall have the benefit
of the insurance that may have been
effected :" Jackson Co. v. Boylston Miti.
Is. Co., suqpra.
As stated in the principal case, the
validity of contracts such as the one in
question was recognized in Tate v. Hsop (1885), L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 368,
which was a case of marine insurance.
The insurer was accustomed to charge
a higher rate of premium upon shipments under contracts giving no recourse

el a.

against the carrier, except for negligence. This practice was known to the
insured, who failed, however, to inform
the insurer that he had entered into,
such a contract. His concealment of
this fact was held to have been fraudulent and to have vitiated his policy.
The Supreme Court of the United
States in the case, already cited, of
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transporlaion Co. (I886),117 U. S. 32; S.C.,25
AMER. LAW REG. 330, have adopted
and followed the rule stated in the foregoing decisions. The reasons for so
doing are thus clearly given in the
opinion of GRAY, J. : "The insurer
stands in no relation of contract or of
privity with such persons (i.e., the carriers). His title arises out of the contract of insurance, and is derived from
the assured alone, and can only be enforced in the right of the latter. In a
court of common law, it can only be
asserted in his own name, and, even in
a court of equity or of admiralty, it can
only be asserted in his right. In any"
form of remedy, the insurer can take
nothing by subrogation but the rights of
the assured * * * . The right of action against another person, the equitable interest in which passes to the insurer, being only that which the assured had, it follows that, if the assured
has no such right of action, none passes.
to the insurer; and that, if the assured's
right of action is limited or restricted
by lawful contract between him and the
person sought to be made responsible
for the loss, a suit by the insurer, in the
right of the assured, is subject to like
limitations or restrictions." The doctrine of this case was recognized very
recently in Live]pool & G. W. Steam
Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (I889), 129
U. S.397.
The latest consideration of the question, with the exception of the principal
case, was by the Court of Appeals of'
.
New York in Plat v. Richmond,
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premium for the policy. To restore
R. & C. R. R. Co. (t8SS), ioS N. Y.
358. The Court there expressly adopt themselves to the position which they
the reasoning of Justice GRAY, just occupied before such stipulations had
been devised, insurance companies have
quoted. It may, therefore, be now reinserted in thcir pqlicies warranties that
garded as settled law, that a stipulation,
the insurance shall not inure to the Lengiving a common carrier the benefit of
efit of any cartier. The validity and
the shipper's insurance, is valid, and
that such a stipulation will operate to effect of such a warranty were considdefeat any claim to damages on the part ered in the principal case, where the
question appears to have directly arisen
of the insurer, either by right of subrogation or by express assignment, for the for the first time. The principles involved have, however, been several
reason that the insurer, in either case,
times the subjects of adjudication.
takes only the rights of the insured,
In the case of Carstairsv. Afechansubject to all his lawful engagements
ics' and Traders' Ins. Co. (U. S. C. Ct.,
and the limitations and restrictions of
D. Md., 1883), 18 Fed. Repr. 473,
his contract.
In The Sidney (U. S. C. Ct., S. D. there was a stipulation in the policy that
N. Y., 1885), 23 Fed. Repr. 88, it the insurer, in case of loss, should be
was held, that it was not even ne- subrogated to all claims against the
transporter of the merchandise insured.
cessary that the stipulation should be
The insured contracted to give the carinserted in the bill of lading, but that
it would "be equally valid when clearly rier the benefit of the insurance. The
goods were lost while in transit and the
proved to exist by extrinsic evidence."
This case is cited with apparent ap- insurance company defended to the
proval in Phcenix Ts. .Co. v. Erie claim of the insured, on the ground that
by his contract with the carrier he had
Transportation Co., sitra.
defeated the right of subrogation, and
The existence of such a stipulation
rendered impossible the performance of
in the bill of lading will not, however,
the stipulation in his policy. TheCourt
operate as a defense to an action by the
(MORRIS, J.) sustained this position,
owner, when it does not appear that he
has actually realized anything from his saying: "If the plaintiffs should recovinsurance: Inman v. South Carolina er in this suit compensation from the
insurance company, the agreement in
Ry. Co. (1889), 129 U. S. 128.
4. Efet of warranty that the in- the bill of lading, if valid, has made it
impossible for them to do what, by both
suranceshall not inure to the beneit of
the printed and the written clauses of
any earrier.-Fromthe foregoing rethe policy, they agreed to do, namely,
view of the course of the decisions, it
will be seen that a common carrier is to subrogate the insurance company to
now able to entirely defeat the insur- their claim against the carrier. They
have, in effect, agreed with the insurer's right of subrogation, by the inserance company to subrogate it to their
tion in its bill of lading of a stipulation
claim against the railroad, and have alsG
giving it the benefit of the insurance.
agreed with the railroad to subrogate it
The practical operation of this principle
to any claim they may have against the
imposes upon the insurer the payment
insurance company * * * . The insurof all losses by fire, suffered by goods
in course of transportation, and the car- ance company, being practically in the
rier is protected, to the extent of the position of a surety, and having a right
to the subrogation, and the plaintiffs
insurance, without having made any
having, by the terms of the bill of ladcontract with the insurer or paid any
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ing under which they claim the goods,
defeated that right, they cannot be allowed to recover in this action."
The same question was involved in
the case of Iniman v. South Carolina
Ry.Co. (1889), 129 U. S. 128, which
was an action by the shipper against the
carrier to recover for goods lost by fire,
while in course of transportation. The
carrier alleged, in defence, that it had
not received the benefit of the plaintiff's
insurance on the goods, as stipulated in
the bill of lading. It appeared that
none of the insurance had been paid by
the companies, and that all the policies
e owner's
provided for the transfer
claim against the carrier to the insurer
on payment of the loss, and that some
of them contained further provisions
forfeiting the insurance, in case any
agreement was made by the insured
whereby the insurer's right to recover
from the carrier was released or lost.
It was held by FULLER, C. J., that the
insured could have recovered upon his
policies only "upon condition of resort
over against the carrier, any act of the
owner's to defeat which operated to
cancel the liability of the insurers; they
(the policies) could not, therefore, be
made available for the benefit of the
carrier.",
The principle of these cases was again
recognized in Phenix Ins. Co. v. Parsons (1889), 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 423,
an action upon a policy of marine insurance.
In two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the effect
of stipulations requiring the assignment
to the insurer of the insured's cause of
action, is strikingly illustrated. A trustee had procured insurance upon a
building belonging to the trust estate in
two different companies. One policy
provided that, "when this company
shall claim that the fire was caused by
an act or omission of any person, town
or corporation, which created a cause

of action, the party to whom the loss is
payable under this policy, shall, on receiving payment, assign to this company
such cause of action." The other contained no such provision. The property
insured was damaged by fire, originating from a gas explosion, which was
chargeable to the negligence of the gas
company, giving the owner a right of
action against the latter. Before payment upon the policies, the owner settled with and released the gas company
from all claims arising out of the explosion, the release stipulating that it
was not to affect the claims of the owner against the insurance companies. He
then brought suit upon his policies. It
was held, in the case of the policy
which contained the condition requiring
an assignment of the insured's cause of
action, the opinion being by VILLIAIMS,
3., that the release of the gas company,
which made "performance of the covenant to assign either impossible or useless, would felieve the insurance company of its concurrent covenant to
pay:" WiagaraFire Ins. Co. v. Fidelit' Title and Trust Co. (1889), 123 Pa.
516. On the other hand, where there
was no express covenant to assign, the
mere existence of the equitable right
of subrogation would give the insurer
no claim to substitution until the liability had been discharged. Therefore,
in the latter case, the release of the
wrong-doer would not constitute a defense to the claim of the insured upon
his policy: Ins. Co. of North America
V..Easton (1889), 123 Pa. 523.
The authorities cited appear to establish the doctrine that, where the owner
of goods in transit contracts both to
give the carrier the benefit of his insurance and also to assign to the insurer
his cause of action against the carrier,
he forfeits all claim upon his policy, but
may still recover against the carrier.
The principal case extends this doctrine
to policies in which it is warranted that
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-the insurance shall not inure to the benefit of any carrier. In either case the
.carrier may, of course, be protected by
taking out a policy directly upon its
own interest in the goods.
It will be noticed that the policy in
the principal case, antedated the contract of carriage. Whether a similar
warranty, in a policy issued subsequently
to the date of the bill of lading, would
have the same force, yet remains to be
decided. The principles laid down in
the various decisions here considered,
would seem, however, to require an
affirmative answer to this question.
A novel question, idvolving some of
-the subjects under discussion, arose in
Xidd v. Greenwich Ins. Co., C. Ct. U.
S., S. D. N. Y. (1888), 35 Fed. Repr.
35z. The insurance was upon certain
barrels of spirits and covered the excess
of value above $20 per barrel, less a
stipulated amount to be deductedin lieu
Of average. The policy provided that
the insured, by accepting payment,
would assign and transfer to the insurer
all his claim, by reason of the los,
against the carrier or others, to the extent of the amount paid him, and that
any act of the insured, waiving or tending to defeat or decrease anysuch claim,
whether before or after the insurance,
would operate to cancel the policy.

The insurer entered into an agreement
with the carrier that the spirits should be
carried at a stipulated valuation of $20
per barrel, the actual value being over
$97. The goods were burned while in
transit, and the owner received from the
carrier payment at the rate of $20 per
barrel. He then brought suit against
the insurance company for his loss in
excess of that amount. Defense was
made on the ground that, under the provisions of the policy which have been
cited, the agreement to restrict the carrier's liability rendered the contract of
insurancevoid. Butthe Court (WHEELER, J.) held that these provisidns of the
policy did not mean "that all liability
of the carrier, which might arise, shall
be insisted upon and created and not
diminished from what it would be without special contract, but that the claim
against the carrier, as it actually exists
in favor of the insured, shall not be
waived or diminished, and shall inure
to the benefit of the insurer. The policy
does not provide that any liability of the
carrier shall be perfected, but that, if
one is perfected, it shall remain for the
benefit of the insurer." Recovery was,
therefore, allowed. In view of the later
decisions, cited above, the soundness of
this rule must be considered doubtful.
JAMES C. SELLERS.

Supreme Court of iMiichigan.
BURTON v. TUITE.
A statute declared that the custodians of municipal records should furnish proper
and reasonable facilities for the inspection and examination of the records and files
in their respective offices, to all persons having occasion to examine them for any
lawful purpose, and also for making memoranda or transcripts therefrom during
business hours. Held, that under this statute, a person making and dealing in
abstracts of title has the right to examine the tax sales books in the city treasurer's
office.
The receiver of taxes in Detroit makes up an annual statement of his sales for
unpaid taxes and delivers it to the city treasurer, who notes therein such redemptions as may be made, or the sale of any tax-bids. This statement is not one that
VOL. XXXVIII.-4
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is required by law. Held, that it is nevertheless a public record, and therefore
open to public inspection by citizens.
A public municipal corp6ration, like a city, can have no private books, not even
of accounts, that are not open to the inspection of its citizens.
The doings of a municipal corporation, and the doings of its officers, and the
records and files in their offices, must be open to public inspection by its citizens,
without charge.
It has never been a common law rule in the United States, that the public had
no right of free access to the public records, and to the public inspection thereof.
And no special interest in the subject-matter of the record need be shown, to entitle
one to such right.
A statute which confers a right upon "all persons," confers it upon any person.
Webber v. Yownley, 43 Mich. 534, overruled.
A public officer has no exclusive right, as against other citizens, to search the
records in his charge; and he has no right to exact fees for searches made, unless.
they ar made by himself or his subordinates.

Henry A. Chaney (Hoyt Post with him), for relator.
John W. McGrath and Edward Minock for respondent.
MoRsE, J., December 28, 1889. The relator asks for the
writ of mandamus, to compel the respondent to permit him to
inspect and examine the "records and files in the City Treasurer's office at Detroit, and to furnish proper and reasonable
facilities for such inspection and examination, and for making
memoranda and transcripts from such files and records, in
compliance with Act No. 205 of the Public Acts of 1889.
The Act in question,,reads as follows" That the officers having the custody of any county, city or town records in this
State, shall furnish proper and reasonable facilities for the inspection and examination of the records and files in their respective offices, and for making memoranda
or transcripts therefrom, during the usual business hours, to all persons having
occasion to make examination of them for any lawful purpose. Provided, That
the custodian of said records and files may make such reasonable rules and regulations, with reference to the inspection and examination of them, as shall be necessary for the protection of said records and files, and to prevent the interference with
the regular discharge of the duties of such officer. And trovided fierther, That
such officer shall prohibit the use of pen and ink, in making copies or notes of
records and files:"

Public Acts of 1889, p. 286.

Relator shows in his petition that he is engaged in the abstract business in the city of Detroit, and has invested a large
sum of money in said business; that his business requires that
he should know what taxes, levied by the city of Detroit, are
liens upon property of which he is furnishing abstracts, and by
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whom such liens, if any, are held; that when lands are sold for
unpaid taxes, the sale is conducted by the receiver of taxes. A
statement of such sales, in book form, is made by the receiver
and turned over to the City Treasurer, in whose custody it thereafter remains. When sales are redeemed or city bids sold,
such redemption is minuted in this book. That it is necessary
in said relator's business to frequently consult this book. If
proper facilities were granted him, he would not need to consult the same more than ten minutes in any one day. That
the prevailing rule and custom is, in all the city and county
offices, to permit all persons to have free access to the records
therein, and he himself has ordinarily been allowed this privilege, without obstruction or restraint, except in the case of the
respondent, who is City Treasurer of the city of Detroit.
That said respondent has frequently refused to permit relator to inspect the sales books above referred to, as have also
his subordinates; and, if at times, an inspection of such records has been granted, it has always been accompanied with
insulting language, implying that relator was taking time which
belonged to the public, and that he must hurry, or that the
books would be taken from him; and this, too, although no
other parties were present to be waited upon or attended to,
and though much more time was consumed by said treasurer
in making such complaints than would be necessary for relator
to inspect and make such memoranda as he needed, if he could
have access to the records without unreasonable interruption.
A clerk would be detailed to see that the relator did not mutilate the records, with instructions not to permit relator to
take the books. But more frequently relator has been told by
the said city treasurer and his subordinates, that he could not
see the records. Respondent has followed this obstructive
course for a long time, to the great annoyance and discomfort
of relator, and in the face of the fact that there was posted in
his office a notice to the effect that all information desired by
the public would be cheerfully and promptly furnished. That
respondent at one time informed relator that it was a matter of
money with him, and that if relator would pay him twentyfive dollars per month, relator could have what access he
pleased to the records in said treasurer's office.
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July 2, 1889, relator called at the treasurer's office at about
eleven o'clock, A. ix, and requested the privilege of inspecting
some of the sales books. Respondent asked if the information
wanted was for relator's private business. Relator replied that
Richard M. Coon was the owner of lot 24, in Wesson's section of the Thompson farm, in the city of Detroit, and that he
had employed relator to see if certain tax sales, which had
been previously made, were still held by the city, or disposed
of, and if disposed of, to whom. Respondent requested relator
to write out what he wanted on a piece of paper, which he
did. The paper was handed to a clerk who was called by the
respondent to wait on relator. The parcel of land had been
sold in six successive years, and it became necessary to inspect
six different sales books. That the statement which relator
had made for the clerk, a copy of which he retained, informed
the clerk the number of the book required, the page of the
book and the line on the page which he desired to inspect.
That said clerk produced four of the books required, and they
were hastily inspected by relator, but he was not permitted to
handle them. "
During the examination, -;hich could hardly have occupied
ten minutes, respondent himself sat by, discussing the general
subject of relator's rights, and apparently in no wise hurried
by pressure of official duties. That after relator had inspected
the fourth volume, said clerk-taking his cue from the language
and actions of his employer, said respondent-abruptly, violently and unreasonably refused to produce the other two
books requested, and left the room. That relator then asked
the City Treasurer himself to produce the two books asked for,
but said treasurer refused. Relator then told respondent that
he would get the books himself, if he, respondent, would permit him, relator, to go into the room where said books were,
for that purpose. Respondent told him he could not go into
that room, and absolutely refused to permit him to see the
books he desired. Relator offered respondent ten dollars per
month to be accorded such treatment as is accorded to the
public. Respondent refused the offer. Relator then formally
demanded the right to inspect the two books he had asked for
before, and reminded respondent of the Statute. Relator said
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that if he could not see the books, he should ask for a mandamus. Respondent told him to "mandam," if he wanted to;
that the books were in the vault, and relator could not see
them, and that nothing but an order from the Common Council would make him remove them. He told relator to leave a
written memorandum of what he wanted, and relator refused
to do this, as he had already furnished respondent with one
statement of what he required. Respondent became vociferous, declaring that he had disposed of the subject, refused to
hear anything further, and left the room. Relator then, under
the advice of counsel, made a new memorandum of what he
wanted and offered it to the Deputy Treasurer, who said he had
no time to attend to it. Relator told him he need not attend
to it then, as he would send his clerk for it, laid the memorandum on the table, and placed a paper-weight upon it. Respondent came in about then, in a high temper, and with some
profanity, ordered the relator out of the office, which order
relator obeyed. During the whole time of this interview, there
was no other person in the office on business, unless lie was
secluded in the private office of respondent.
The respondent, in his answer, denies that the books referred
to by relator are public records, or that they are made so by
charter, ordinance or law, or that they are required by law to
be kept, or that relator or any person, except respondent, is
entitled to the possession of said books, or entitled to take
them out of the custody of respondent, or to make extracts
from them, except under the immediate supervision of respondent. He denies that it is the universal practice in city offices
to permit all persons desiring to inspect the said books to have
free access to them, or that such is the usage, or that such
usage has become so well established as to have the force of a
common law custom. He denies that relator has been ordinarily allowed to inspect such books without obstruction or
restraint, if by obstruction and restraint is meant a denial of
the right of access to said books without the supervision of
the city treasurer. He denies that the right which relator
seeks to establish is recognized or confirmed by any act of the
Legislature. He denies that at any time this respondent, or
by this respondent's direction or authority, any deputy or clerk
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in respondent's office has accompanied any inspection of the
books which relator has been allowed to make, with insulting
language. He denies that relator has been told by respondent
that he, the relator, could not see the records. He denies that
respondent has been guilty of obstructing relator. He denies
that respondent derives an income from abstracts amounting
to one thousand dollars per annum, or any such sum. He denies that this respondent has ever said, that if relator would
pay respondent twenty-five dollars per month during his term
of office, the relator could have whatever access he desired to
the books in respondent's office. He denies that he made use
of the profane expression alleged by relator.
Respondent also sets forth in his answer, that relator is
seeking the information from the books as a matter of merchandise to sell to others. That up to July 2, 1884, abstracts
could only be procured of the city treasurer, and that the
treasurer whose office expired in 1884, realized from. fifteen
hundred to two thousand dollars annually from tax abstracts,
and that he is informed relator paid such officer for the privflege of making a copy of the books of said office, and did
make and use the same for private gain. That for one year
prior to July I, 1888, relator paid thirty-five dollars per month
for this privilege. That respondent has always been ready and
willing to give any lot-owner or citizen desiring it, information
as to tax charges upon lands, and has always done so free of
charge. He insists that he has the legal right to charge a
small fee for making out abstracts, as there is no law requiring
him to make them otherwise. That the books in question
have been kept for the information and convenience of the city
of Detroit, and are not required to be kept by the city charter
or any law or ordinance.
That each year, after the Receiver of Taxes makes sale of
lands for unpaid taxes, one of said books is made up by such
Receiver, and entered therein is the name of the owner, if
known; a description of each parcel of land; the amount of
the city tax, school tax, etc.; the total tax; the name of the
person to whom sold, which is usually the city of Detroit;
and said books also contain blanks for entry of assignment or
redemption; that there are in all thirty-seven books, con-
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taining from one hundred to two hundred and fifty pages each.
In addition, there are some sales books, containing memoranda
of sales for unpaid special assessments. There are also sixteen (one for each ward) indexes to sales books, each of which
contains a description of each parcel of land in that ward, with
a column for each year, in which to enter, if sold, the number
of the page of the sales book for that year containing the
memoranda of the sale. If a sale has been cancelled, a red
ink line is drawn through the reference figures; that the
books so kept are easily subject to alteration or defacement.
That the books aforesaid are valuable, and the loss of the
same, or any of the same, would be irreparable; that respondent is charged by the city with the care and custody of the
same; that a portion of respondent's office is kept for the use
-ofthe public, and the public is necessarily, by means of desks,
railings and wire work partitions, excluded from the private or
-working department of the office, and from the part containing the moneys, books and papers in respondent's office; that
relator, in order to use the right which he here seeks to establish, must necessarily be admitted to that portion of respond-ent's office from which the general public is excluded; that
the books referred to are kept by respondent in a vault in the
City Treasurer's office, and in the same vault are other valuable
books and papers, together with large sums of the city moneys, varying in amount from one hundred dollars to thirty
thousand dollars; that to produce said books, and a number
-ofthem, as is often required by relator, requires a large amount
of time almost daily, and from ten to thirty minutes per day
have often been consumed in so doing; that respondent insists that it is the duty of respondent, in order to protect himself and his bondsmen, to keep their books under the immediate care, custody and supervision of himself or one of his
trusted employees; that during the month of July, relator's
purpose is not so much to look after individual cases of sales
as it is to compare his minutes of sale with the office memorandum of the same. Respondent submits that he is not obliged
to produce the books of his office, and supervise the inspectiou of the same, to one who is collecting information for merIchandise, and that if he does do so, he is entitled to pay for it.
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He also submits, that in other public offices-in the officeof the Register of Deeds, in the Probate Court, and in the
County Clerk's office-when information is furnished, which
the law does not require to be furnished, charges are made,
and legitimately, for such information. He also shows that
he has given bond for the safe keeping of these records; that
his total fees for abstracts for eleven months, ending December 31, 1888, were but two hundred and forty-three dollars.
And he finally submits, that relator is not entitled to access to
the books of respondent's office at his own pleasure; neither
is he entitled to frequent, or enter into, that portion of respondent's office from which the general public is excluded ;.
that respondent is entitled to supervise the examination of the
books in his office, and that the relator, as a dealer in informa-.
tion, is not entitled to compel respondent to give his time to&
relator, at the pleasure of relator, for his gain and without
compensation to respondent.
It is evident, from the petition and answer, that there is more
or less of ill-feeling between these parties; and it is also clear
that the relator has been, in fact, denied free access to these
sales books, and that the respondent does not propose to permit such access unless he is paid therefor; nor does he pro-pose to furnish any facilities, reasonable or otherwise, to the
relator to inspect and examine said books, without pay.
This right of relator, claimed under the Statute, is denied,.
first, on the ground that these books are not public records,,
because there is no express statutory provision, anywhere,.
that such books shall be kept.
These books are made up, in the first place, by the Receiver
of Taxes, and by him handed over to the City Treasurer.
They are, therefore, books used and kept in two of the public
offices in the city of Detroit, and they must be considered'
public records. The claim that they are private books of account is absurd. They are neither the private books of the
Receiver of Taxes nor of the City Treasurer, and the city of'
Detroit, a public municipal corporation, can have no private
books, not even of accounts, not open to the inspection of its
citizens. Its doings, and the doings of its officers, and the
records and files in their offices, must be open to the public,
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nor can fees be charged for such inspection to those having
the right to examine and inspect such files and records.
But the broad ground is also taken that the relator has no
lawful right to inspect these sales books without recompense
to the respondent, because he is an abstract maker, and his
business may be, and is, in most cases, to sell to some person
the information gained by such examination; that he does not
come under the statute, because he does not have "occasion
to make examinations of them for a lawful purpose;" and that
this case is covered, and against relator, by two former decisions of this Court: Webber v. Townley (1880), 43 Mich. 534;
Diamond Matcl Co. v. Powers (1883), 5i Id. 145.
If I understand the latter case, the writ of mandamus was
denied because the Diamond Match Company was not a citizen, nor an inhabitant, nor even a domestic corporation. It
did not show its charter, nor give any evidence of its powers
or artificial capabilities. This Court say:
"We have no reason of knowing that it has capacity to buy lands, or hold them,
or deal in titles anywhere, or to carry on the business in which its petition alleges
it to be engaged; or to apply itself to such an enterprise as making a system of
abstracts of all the titles of all the real property in a county. The case is bare of
information in regard to the true legal status of the relator, and as to whether it is
other than a mere intruder in what it demands."

The petition of the relator alleged that it was incorporated
under the laws of the State of Delaware; that it had become
the purchaser of about thirty thousand acres of pine land in
the county of Ontonagon,.had erected extensive saw mills and
invested nearly two hundred thousand dollars, and was cutting
large quantities of pine and constantly purchasing more land,
and to provide against acquiring defective titles, desired to
protect its rights and interests by providing for itself an abstract
of all the lands in the county. The relator was permitted opportunity to examine and make abstracts as far as its own
ownership or interest was concerned, present or prospective,
but the dispute was whether it had the right to go further and
insist on having office accommodations and the handling of
all the records, to make an abstract of title to all the lands in
the county. While the writer of the opinion, Chief Justice
GRAvEs, paused to make some practical suggestions of obsta-
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dces in the way of proper relief being afforded by mandamus,
the ground of the denial of the writ was that the relator had
failed to show any title to the right it claimed, because the
authority given to it by the State by which it was created was
not disclosed, and could not be assumed. See Diamondjfatch
Co. v. Powers (1883), 51 Mich., at pages 147, 148. In the view
of the case above cited, I do not think that it is any authority
bearing against the relator's claim in this case.
And I cannot agree with the opinion of this Court, or the
reasons given for it, in Webber v. Townley, supzra. Nor do I
anticipate that hardly any, if any, of the results imagined by
the writer of that opinion, would ever occur, if the holding
were otherwise. If any of them should happen, the law is
,powerful enough to remedy them, and "Sufficient unto the
day is the evil thereof."
I do not think that any common law ever obtained in this
free government that would deny to the people thereof the right
of free access to and public inspection of public records. They
have an interest always in such records, and I know of no law,
written or unwritten, that provides, that before an inspection
or examination of a public record is made, the citizen who
wishes to make it must show some special interest in such
record., I have a right, if I see fit, to examine the title of my
neighbor's property, whether or not I have any interest in it,
or intend ever to have. I also have the right to examine any
title that I see fit, recorded in the public offices, for purposes
of selling such information, if I desire. No one has ever disputed the right of a lawyer to enter the register's office and
examine the title of his client to land as recorded, or the title
of the opponent of his client, and to charge his client for the
information so obtained. This is done for private gain as a
part of the lawyer's daily business, and by means of which,
with other labors, he earns his bread. Upon what different
footing can an abstractor-can Mr. Burton-be placed within
the law, without giving a privilege to one man, or class of
men, that is denied to another?
The relator's business is that of making abstracts of title and
furnishing the same to those wanting them, for a compensation. In such a business it is necessary for him to consult and
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make memoranda of the contents of these books. His business is a lawful one, the same as is the lawyer's, and why has
he not the right to inspect and examine public records in his
business as well as any other person? If he is shut out because he uses his information for private gain, how will it be
with the dealer in real estate, who examines the records before
he buys or sells, and buys and sells for private gain? Any
holding that shuts out Mr. Burton from the inspection of these
records, for this reason also shuts out every other person, except the buyer, seller, or holder of a particular lot of lands, or
one having a lien upon it, or an agent of one of them, acting
as such agent without fee or reward. It cannot be inferred
that the Legislature irntended that this statute should apply
only to a particular class of persons, as, for instance, those only
who are interested in a particular piece of land. "Any person"
means all persons.
I can see no danger of great abuses, or inconveniences, likely
to arise from the right to inspect, examine, or make note of
public records, even if such right be granted to those who get
their living by selling the information thus gained. The inconvenience to the office is guarded against by the statute,
which authorizes the incumbent to make reasonable rules and
regulations with reference to the inspection. And when abuses
are shown, there will no doubt be found by the Legislature, or
the courts, a remedy for them.
It is plain to me that the Legislature intended to assert the
right of all citizens, in the pursuit of a lawful business, to make
such examination of the public records in public offices as the
necessity of their business might require, subject to such rules
and restrictions as are reasonable and proper under the circumstances.
The respondent in this case is the lawful custodian of these
sales books, and is responsible for their safe keeping. And he
may make and enforce proper regulations, consistent with the
public right, for the use of them. But they are public property, for public use, and he has no lawful authority to exclude
any of the public from access to and examination and inspection thereof at proper seasons. It follows that he has no right
to demand any fee or compensation for the privilege of access
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to the records, or for any examination thereof, not made by"
himself or his clerks or deputies. He has no exclusive right
to search the records, as against any other citizen: Lum v.
.ikcCal-ty (1877), 39 N. J. L. 287 ; Boylan v. Warren (I888), 39
Kan. 3oi; Colev.Racliac (1887), 37 Minn. 372; GermanLoan
and Trust Co. v. Richards (885), 99 N. Y. 620; Hanson v.
Eiclstaedt (1887), 69 Wis. 538.
It follows, in my opinion, that the prayer of the petitioner
must be granted, and the writ issue as prayed, the relator asking in this writ no more than the statute gives him.
CHAMPLIN, J., concurred.
CAMPBELL, J.: I think relator has such an interest as entitle&

him, under the law of 1889, to see the'book in question, and
confine my opinion to that point.
SHERWOOD, C. J., and LONG, J., did not sit in this case.
This annotation is confined to a discussion of the statutes) and decisions
thereunder, of the various States, where
abstract companies and private persons
have sought the free and constant use
of the public records, in the course of
compiling and keeping up, for profit, a
statement of all the titles to land, in a
city, township, county, or other local
division of a State: that isAlabama, pp. 64,66.
Colorado, p. 67.
Georgia, pp. 64, 67, 68.
Kansas, pp. 63, 66.
Michigan; pp. 49, 65, 67.
Minnesota, p. 62.
New Jersey, pp. 6o, 65, 67.
New York, p. 66.
Pennsylvania, p. 65.
Wisconsin, pp. 61, 68.
The public nature of the public records of private documents was well
explained in one of the decisions cited
in the principal case. "The [county]
clerk is the lawful custodian of the
records, and indexes thereto, and is responsible for the safe keeping thereof.
His powers over them are such as are
necessary for their protection and pres-

ervation. To that end, he may make
and enforce proper regulations, consistent with the public right, for the use
of them. But they are public property,
for public use, and he has no lawful
authority to exclude any of the public
from access to, and inspection and examination thereof, at proper seasons, and
on proper application. The clauses
which declare the public right in this
behalf, employ the most comprehensive
and general language: 'All persons desiring to examine the same,' 'Everyperson shall have access,' etc. It follows that the clerk has no right to demand any fee for the privilege of access.
to the records and indexes, or for any
examination thereof, not made by himself or his assistants. He has no exclusive right to search the records:"
RUNYON, C., IueM v. .l'cCarty (1877),.
39 N. J. Law 287, 290. The party refused was an attorney, not engaged in
abstracting, and had been refused access
to the records until he paid, under protest, the fees chargeable if the clerk had
made the search. This suit was to recover the sum paid, and was successful.
The New Jersey Staute,-, under which
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ihe aforegoing case was decided, provide
(Revision of 1877, p. 157)-" 25. That
the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas
of the county shall record, in large, wellbound books of good paper, to be provided for that purpose and carefully
preserved, all deeds and conveyances
of lands, tenements and hereditaments,
lying and being in the said county, acknowledged or proved, and certified to
have been acknowledged or proved in
manner aforesaid, which shall be delivered to him to be recorded; and, also,
all other instruments which are by this
Act directed therein to be recorded; to
which books every person shall have
access at proper seasons, and be entitled
to transcripts from the same, on paying
the fees allowed by law."
And (Id. 705)-" 17. The clerk of
the Court of Common Pleas of every
county of this State shall, from time to
time, provide fit Looks, well bound and
lettered, for registering all mortgages
and defeasible deeds in the nature of
mortgages, of lands, tenements and
hereditaments, lying and being within
his coun:y, in which shall be entered
the names of the mortgagor and mortgagee, the date of the mortgage, .the
mortgage money and when payable, and
the description and boundaries of the
lands, tenements, and hereditaments,
mortgaged; that the said clerk shall,
immediately on receiving the said mort-.
gage, make the said entry or abstract in
the register, and shall note in the margin,
or at the foot of such abstract, the day
of the month and the year when the
said mortgage was delivered to him or
brought to his office to Le recorded; to
which book every person shall have access atproperseasons, and maysearch the
same, paying the fees allowed by law."
Another of the citations in the principal case, would seem to indicate that
at least one public officer was made to
feel his duty, first, by the action of the
individual, and then, by the denial of

an injunction to restrain the abstractor:
Hanson v. .Eichstaedt(887), 69 Wis.
538.
The Revised Statutes of Wisconsin
(chap. 37, p-247,) provide-" SECTION
7oo. Every sheriff, clerk of the circuit
court, register of deeds, county treasurer and county clerk, shall keep his
office at the county seat, and in the
office provided by the county or by special provisions of law; if there be none
such, then at such place as the county
board shall direct; and shall keep such
office open during the usual business
hours each day, Sundays and legal holidays excepted; and with proper care,
shall open to the examination of any
person, all books and papers required
to be kept in his office, and permit any
person so examining, to take notes and
copies of such books, records or papers,
or minutes therefrom; and if any such
officer shall neglect or refuse to comply
with any of the provisions of this section, he shall forfeit five dollars for every
day such noncompliance shall continue.
Actions for the collection of the forfeiture herein provided, may be brought in
all cases of such refusal or neglect, in
the manner provided by law, upon the
complaint of the district attorney of the
proper county, or of any party aggrieved
by such neglect or refusal."
Commenting on this section, CASSODAY, J., said-" This language, literally
construed, certainly includes the defendant. The words ' any persons,' when
so construed, are distributive, and include every person. By what authority,
then, are we to construe these words as
only applicable to a particular class of
persons, as, for instance, those only who
are interested in the particular piece of
land, the record of which is sought to
be inspected or copied? If so, how is
the fact of such interest to be determined-by the applicant, or by the
register? Is the register to accept,
without question, the statement of the
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applicant, or may he require other evito others for compensation, along with
dence ? Of course, every statute is to
other persons, whether interested in
be construed with reference to its object
such records or not, all alike, have the
and subject-matter; and in that way, it
right to examine and abstract the recfrequently occurs that general words
ords of the register of deeds, in the
are limited in their operation: Wilb.
manner provided by Gen. Stat. 1878, c.
Stat. Laws, 173-177. Here the sub8, 179, as amended by Laws of 1885,
ject-matter is the examination of the
c. 116; that is (Gen. Stat., vol. 2, p.
public books and records in the regis'33)-" '79. The register shall exter's office, and the taking of notes,
hibit, free of charge, during the hours
minutes, and copies therefrom; and the that his office is, or is required by law
statute requires the register, under a
to be open, any of the records orpapers
penalty, to permit any person to so exin his official custody, to the inspection
amine and take notes, minutes and copof any person demanding the same,
ies. Under such a statute, can we say
either for examination or for the purthat when a respectable person, in a pose of making or completing an abrespectful manner, applies to the regisstract or transcript therefrom; provided,
ter to make such examination, etc., he that whenever, in the opinion of the
is to be excluded, merely because he
board of county commissioners, it is for
does not belong to some class of per- the benefit of the people of their counsons unnamed or undefined in the stat- ty, that any person, company or corute; or, if permission is given, is his
poration, who has or may have a set of
examination, etc., to be confined to abstracts of title, should be permitted to
lands in which he, or his clients, have
occupy any part of the county building
a present pecuniary interest."
for an office, such board may, by resoAnd distinguishing the Alabama and
lution, give such person, company or
Michigan cases (hfra, pp. 64, 57), the corporation permission so to do. And
same judge said-" On the contrary, we
in every such case, such board shall remust hold that our statute in question
quire of such person, company or corextends such right of examination, etc.,
poration a bond in a sum not less than
to 'any person' applying to such cus- five hundred dollars, nor more than
todian of public records in a proper
five thousand dollars, with two or more
manner; subject, however, to the pay- sureties, to be approved by the comment of fees, when allowed, and such
missioners, conditioned that such perreasonable supervision and control by
son, company or corporation will handle
such officer as are essential to the conall public records belonging to the
venient performance of his duties and
county with due care, and will not
the current business of the public: It
charge any greater fee for making abmay be that more definite regulations
stracts than is or may be allowed the
should be made in such matters, but
register of deeds for like services and
that is a question for the Legislature,
for the faithful performance of his duties
and not for us."
as an abstractor: provided further, that
Another citation in the principal case
nothing contained in this act shall be
is valuable as recognizing the object in
construed as giving any person the right
view of the Legislature in passing the to have or use the said record for the
statute: State ex rel.v. Rachac (1887),
purpose of making or completing an
37 Minn. 372. Here the Court decided
abstract or transcript therefrom when it
that those who are in the business of
would interfere or hinder the register of
making and furnishing abstracts of title deeds in the performance of his official
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duties, or as permitting any person to
take any of said records from the register of deeds' office without his consent.
But no register of deeds is bound to
record any deed, mortgage or other instruments unless the fees therefor are
tendered him in advance."
Commenting upon the amendatory
act, MITCHELL, J.,said-" While its
operation is not confined to those engaged in the so-called ' abstract business,' yet, in its language and general
scope, it shows that these were prominently in the mind of the Legislature.
The original statute gave to every one
demanding it, the right 'to inspect'
these records. But, as there might be
doubt what the rights of inspection
included, the amendment adds, ' either
for examination or for the purpose of
making or completing an abstract or
transcript therefrom. As indicating
what and whom the Legislature had in
mind, the act further provides, that the
county commissioners may permit any
person having a set of 'abstracts of
title' to occupy a part of the county
building for an office :" 37 Minn. 374.
Where the question was decided adversely to the right of an abstractor to
make copies of the entire records of the
office of a register of deeds (Cormack
v. Wolcott, 1887, 37 Kan. 391), CLOYsToN, C., admitted that the question
was an embarrassing one, and that the
Court was "not free from doubt. At
common law, parties had no vested
rights in the examination of a record of
title, or other public records, save by
some interest in the land or subject of
record. So no authorities at common
law can throw any light upon this question-the practice of making abstract
records being of more recent date :"
P. 394. This decision was affirmed in
Boylan v. Warrent (x885), 39 Kan.
301, to the extent that the register of
deeds will not be compelled by mandamus to permit any person to make

copies of the entire records in his office,
for the purpose of making a set of abstract books for private use or speculation. "The refusal of the officer in
charge, to permit a person to gratify a
mere idle curiosity, or to examine the
records for the mere purpose of taking
copies or metorandathereof, for some
supposed possible use in the future, or
to examine the records, when they are
otherwise rightfully and properly in use
by some other person, cannot constitute a basis for any kind of action.
Some present and existing riz/st of
a person must be infringed to the
injzzry of such person, before any cause
of action of any kind can accrue in his
favor :" VALENTINE, 3., p. 305.
These decisions were based upon
Art. 15, C. 25, Comp. Laws of Kansas,
I88I, which provide-" SEC. 172. Every county officer shall keep his office
at the seat of justice of his county, and
in the office provided by the county, if
any such has been provided; and if
there be none established, then at such
place as shall be fixed by special provisions of law; or, if there be no such
provisions, then at such place as the
board of county commissioners shall
direct, and they shall each keep the
same open during the usual business
hours of each day (Sundays excepted);
and all books and papers required to
be in their offices, shall be open for the
examination of any person; and if any
of said officers shall neglect to comply
with fhe provisions of this section, he
shall forfeit, for each day he so neglects, the sum of five dollars : Provided,
That in counties of less than five thousand inhabitants, the probate judge
shall not be compelled to keep his office
open at the county seat, except at the
regular term, except the county commissioners shall so order."
But still, in the latter case (Boylan
v. Warren), the Court was careful to
say: "Before closing this opinion, it
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-would, perhaps, be proper to state that
'any person,' even an abstracter of titles,
-who may have sufficient interest in the
information to be obtained from the
'public county records to entitle him to
.n examination of the same, may, if he
chooses, make copies, abstracts, extracts,
-or memoranda therefrom. There is no
statute and no good reason against it :"
p. 307.
The same denial of inspection of the
records of a probate judge, on the ground
that the purpose was speculative, or from
idle curiosity, was reached in Rando
1 1
v. The State (1886). 82 Ala. 527, 529.
The relators were dbstracters and desired to abstract all the titles to real
estate in the county, claiming a right so
to do under section 698 of the Code of
1876 (Code of 1887, chap. 5, P. 235)" 791. (698.) The records of the office
[of the judge of probate] must be free
for the examination of all persons, when
not in use by the judge." The same
chapter also provides--." 789. (695.) It
is the duty of the judge of probate,--7.
,On application of any person, and the
payment or tender of the lawful fees, to
give transcripts of any paper, or record,
required to be kept in his office, properly
certified."
In deciding this case of .Randolp v.
The State, the Conit felt bound to limit
their previous decisions in Brewer v.
Watson (1882), 71 Ala. 299, and Phelan
v. The State (1884), 76 Ala. 49; these
decisions related to other offices, not
open to free statutory examinations.
Here the Court thought it expedient to
point out that they had not had before
them the claim of right to make memoranda, and said: "We must not, however, be understood as intending to
abridge the right, conferred by statute,
of ' free examination,' by all persons
having an interest, of the records of the
probate judge's office. Nor will we
confine this right to a mere right to inspect. He may make memoranda, or

copies, if he will, and, to this end, may
employ an agent or attorney. The limitation is, that he must not obstruct the
officers in charge in the performance of
their official duties, by withholding records from them when needed for the
performance of an official function. Nor
is this right of examination confined to
persons claiming title, or having a present pecuniary interest in the subjectmatter. It will embrace all persons
interested, presently or prospectively, in
the chain of title, or nature of incumbrance, proposed to be investigated.
The right of free examination is the rule,
and the inhibition of such privilege,
when the purpose is speculative, or from
idle curiosity, is the exception:" 82
Ala. 529.
The same sentiments were expressed
in Buck &- SPencer v. Collins (1874),
51 Ga. 391.
In this State, the Code
provides (ed. 1882, p. 9)-"8 14. All
books kept by any public officer under
the laws of this State, shall be subject
to the inspection of all the citizens of
this State, within office hours, every day,
except Sundays and holidays." This
was enacted in 1831, long before the
days of abstracts and other modern conveniences; and the Court (opinion by
McCAY, J.,) denied the right to make
the abstracts, as "a perversion of the
purpose for which the books are kept.
* * * It is an unnecessary flaunting of
private matters before the public gaze :"
Id. 394The absence, at common law, of any
general or public right of inspl-ction of
public records [I Greenlf. Ev. a 473-5],
was also made the foundation of the
overruled case of PWbber v. Towznly
(supra,p.57), in Michigan. MARSTON,
C. J. : "The right to an inspection, and
copy, or abstract of, a public record, is
not given indiscriminately to each and
all who may, from curiosity or otherwise,
desire the same, but is limited to those
who have some interest therein. What
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'that interest must be, we are not called
there must be great, if not insuperable,
upon, in the present case, to determine.
difficulty in enforcing the claim by man'The question has usually arisen where
damus. The register [of deeds of the
the right claimed was to inspect, or obcounty] has rights and duties which
tain a copy, of some particular document,
must be respected; so the general public
,or those relating to a given transaction,
have rights as well as the claimant; and
-or title. We have not been referred to
the conditions are not steadily the same.
any authority which recognizes the right
They are subject to variation. On every
-of a person, under the common law, to
occasion, each must act reasonably, and
,a copy, or abstract, of the entire records with proper regard for the rights and
duties of the others."
,of a public office, in which [as in this
ease] he had no special interest, the
In the City of Philadelphia, the recbject in view being simply private gain
cords of the Recorder of Deeds have
from the possession and use thereof. been examined three times, and those of
'The object sought by the relators may
the Register of Wills and the Prothonotary of the Courts, twice; though with
be considered as of such modem origin
us not to have been contemplated, or much wear upon the books for the time,
still, on the whole, with little inconvecovered, by the common law authorities
relating to the inspection of public re- nience above those inseparable from the
use of the record books by a large num-cords, and the reason upon which those
authorities rest, would exclude relators ber of persons at once. This occurred
chiefly from a spirit of accommodation
from the right claimed :" p. 537.
The Court made no citations, but the ,shown after the decision by the local
Court of Common Pleas (No. 2) in
more important of the citations of counsel may be found in one of them: State Comm. ex re. v. O'Donnel (1882), r2
NV. N. C. (Pa.) 291; S. c., 15 Phila. 197,
v. Williams (1879), 41 N. J.Law 332;
where the Recorder of Deeds refused to
S. C., 19 AMER. LAw REGISTER 154.
As Webber v. Town'ey was decided
a title insurance company immediate
information of the filing for record of
-under the Act, No. 54, approved March
26, 1875 (Laws, p. 5 ), it is only neces- every deed or writing brought into his
sary to add that this Act differs from the
office, on the ground that the company
Act of 188 9 only in the words "registers
used the information to issue certificates
-of deeds in this State" throughout the
of search in rivalry with those issued by
the Recorder, and those reducing the
Act, and the use of "may" for " shall"
aggregate of the fees paid into the city
in the last proviso.
The only reasonable ground for the treasury. But the Court awarded a perrefusal, by a servant of the people, of emptory mandamus. The case turned
almost entirely upon the right of the
public information to any citizen, was
expressed by GRAVES, C. J.,
in the Dia- title company, along with other citizens,
mond .fatch Co. v. Powers (supra, p. to purchase a certi3cate of all deeds
57)---"A single consideration of a prac- and writings filed for record, immediately after their filing. The ordinary
tical nature may be suggested here.
Granting that no other difficulties apcertificates of search were usually three
pear, it seems evident that, in any case
or four days behind the legal period of
where the claim is for a continuous use recording.
In the case overruled (Webber v.
of the record office and its public conTownley, Supra, p. 58), MARSTON, C.
tents, from day to day, and week to
week, and not merely for a single occa- J. thought that he expressed some other
reasons for denying access to the records,
,sion, with all its material facts defined,
VOL. XXXVIII.-5
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when, conceding to the relators the right
It is not his duty to permit the office toto abstract the entire records of a public be thronged needlessly with persons
examining its books or papers, but it is
office, he asserted the same right behis duty to regulate, govern and control
longed to all persons, without restriction
of residence, "so that the result may be
his office in such a manner as to permit
more applicants than the register's office
the statutory advantages to be enjoyed
could afford room to. * * * * And, as by other persons not employed by him
the use of the public records cannot thus as largely and extensively as that conbe handed over to the indiscriminate use
sistently can be done. He has no propof those not interested in their future
erty in these books or papers, but is their
preservation, how shall the register pro- mere custodian, whose duty it is securely
tect them from mutilation ?" Very much to preserve and maintain them for the
the same sort of language was used by benefit, advantage and convenience of
CLOYSTON, C., in Cormack v. Wolcott the public. And, in the exercise of his
(supra, p. 63), and by STONE, C. J',discretion, it should undoubtedly be done
Phelan v. The State (1884), 76 Ala. with a view to securing these ends. It
cannot be made the pretense or excuse
49,51But such reasons are obviously so in
for the arbitrary exclusion of any person
theory only, and were practically an- from his office, whose duties require
swered in the principal case: (supra,p. their services there. What the law ex59), as well as in The People ex rel. v.
pects and requires from him is the exerRichards (1885), 99 N. Y. 620, where cise of an unbiased and impartial judgthe register set up that he had given, ment, by which all persons resorting to
accommodation to three employes of the the office, under legal authority, and
title company, and had no room for
conducting themselves in an orderly
more. The statute of that State provides manner, shall be secured their lawful
rights and privileges, and that a corporthat such records shall "at all proper
times be open for the inspecticn of any
ation formed in the manner in which the
relator has been shall be permitted to
person paying the fees allowed by law"
1759;
obtain all the information, either by
(chap. 41o, Act July 1, 1882,
also H 1742, 1747 and 1751).

The

Court sustained the refusal, saying:
"He must transact the current bu'iness
of the office, and allow all persons reasonable facilities to exercise their rights
in his office. * * He must have some
right to say how many persons the
relator could send there, to work at one
time:" EARL, J., p. 623.
Commenting upon the Act of 1882,
DANIELS, J., declared that "The obligation imposed upon the register, to
permit the books, records, and maps of
the office to be examined, is absolute in
its character. * * * * The duty imposed
upon him, in this respect, is entirely
ministerial, and its observance may be
lawfully required through the instrumentality of the writ of mandamus. *"

searches, abstracts, or copies, that the
law has entitled it to obtain :" People
ex rel.v. Reilly (1886), 45 Hun (N. Y.)
429, 434.
The objection arising from a reasonable use of the public records by a
number of citizens, was thus effectually
answered in a case of a mere citizen
and the records of a street commissioner,
by BARNARD, J.,in The People v. Cornell (1866), 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 329,334:
"It would be veryinconvenient to allow
every citizen that chooses so to do, to
come into the office and inspect documents, and make copies of them; and
it is suggested that if they be allowed.
so to do, larger accommodations and
larger clerical force would be required.
I do not understand that there is any
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"veryseriousdifficulty in procuring larger
accommodations and more clerical force,
if that should be found necessary. But
this is a mere anticipated difficulty,
which I apprehend will not practically
,occur. Ifit should occur, I see nodiffi•culty in providing means to remove it."
Contrary to a right of reasonable use
of the public records, is Bean v. The
Peoftie (1883), 7 Col. 200. The claim
•of right to abstract the entire records of
a county was denied, though no aid was
xequired from the recorder; "for he is
charged by statute with the safe keeping,
and preservationof the records, and is
responsible for their truthfulness, and
freedom from mutilation :"

HELm, J.,

p. 2o.
Not that the Court insinuated
either generic or individual traits of mu"tilation, because the opinion proceeds:
"We think the business of relators [who
were abstracters] should be treated as
any other legitimate [sic] private enterprise. There is no law to prevent the
clerk aiding them, if he chooses so to
do, either gratis, or for a stipulated compensation; provided he does not neglect
his official duties. But the Court should
not, by mandamus,compel him to do
this against his will :" p. 202. This is
the same sort of argument so well answered by the Scripture quotation in the
principal case (p. 58, suPra).
This decision, however, is based upon
the interpretation of the General Statutes of the State (chap. xxiii, p. 285,
ed. I883), which provide-" SEC. 667.
Every sheriff, county clerk, county
treasurer and county judge, shall keep
his office at the county seat of his county, and in -the office provided by the
,county, if any such place has been provided; and if there be none established, then at such place as shall be
ixed by special provision of law; or,
if there be no such provision, then at
such place as the board of county commissioners shall direct; and they shall
each keep the same open during the

usual business hours of each day, Sundays and legal holidays excepted, and
all books and papers required to be in
their office, shall be open for the examination of any person; and if any person, or officer, shall neglect to comply
with the provisions of this section, he
shall forfeit, for each day he so neglects,
the sum of five dollars."
The Court said-" We feel confident
that an examination of the statute is
proper, with the view of determining
whether or not the Legislature intended
to grant the privilege here claimed."
And after stating fear for the integrity
of the records, "We are of opinion that
the statute in question was not designed
to allow individuals who wish to abstract the entire records, for future
profit in their private business, the privilege of using continuously the public
property, and of monopolizing, from
day to day, for months and years, a
portion of the time and attention of a
public officer, against his will, and
without recompense. In support of the
foregoing reasons and conclusions, see
.Buck v. Collins (supra, p. 64), and
Webber v. To'wnley (szra,p. 58),"pp. 200, 202.
The same sentiments were expressed
by HAINES, J., in deciding Flemning v.
Clerk afHudson County (1863), 30 N.
J. Law 280, 281; but this was in the
Supreme Court, and the Court of Errors
.and Appeals ruled the other way in
Lum v. McCarty (supra, p. 60).
The same unnecessary fears for the
safety of records inspected "under the
watchful observation of the clerk,"
without paying the fees prescribed in
the Code, were expressed in Buck
Spencer v. Collins (siepra p. 64). In
that State (Georgia), Section 3695 of
the Code (ed. 1882, p. 949), prescribes
the fees for "exemplification of record
* * * for inspection of books, when
their [the clerks of the Superior Courts]
service is required, * * * for examination
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of record and abstract * * 2"

This part

of the fee bill, "by implication, permits
any citizen to make an inspection, without fee, if he does not require the
clerk's aid: * * * All laws are to be
reasonably construed, in view of the
object of them, and in view of other
laws. The object of this permission to
i4sect, without fee, if no aid is required from the clerk, is plain. It is
contemplated that lawyers, public officers and persons familiar with the books,
by having frequent occasion to use
them, may not need the clerk's assistance for the purpose. And, by implication, this permission contemplates
that the clerk shall, in such cases, make
no charge for simply standing by and
noticing that no improper interference
with the record is had. But there is
nothing in this implication (and that is
all it is, at best) which authorizes the
clerk to permit even an inspection, except in his own presence, or in the
presence of his sworn deputy. He is
required [Code, ed. 1882, p. 68], section 267 [9], "To keep all the books,
papers, dockets and records, belonging
to their [his] office, with care and security, ***

* ."

He cannot do this,

if any person may handle or inspect
them, otherwise than under his own
eye. In our judgment, any clerk would
be guilty of a failure in his official duties, should he permit any person, if
only for a minute [sic], though he might
be familiar with the -books, and be able"
to examine them without the clerk's
aid, to have the custody of the books
and papers of his office. * * * It is a
perversion of the right of inspection,

evidently intended to provide for exam-:
inations from time to time, as the ordinary occasions and business of men may
require, to-make a business of it. The
law might well, in view of the ordinary
wants of the people, permit an inspection of the books, when no aid is required from the clerk, without a fee. It
is but a slight hindrance to him in hisduties to keep his eye on the few citizens who visit his office for such purposes, and if he has only to stand by as,
a sentinel to prevent fraud or spoliation,
for a minute or two, it is but a small
matter, and may well be without a fee.
But the law never contemplated that
any person would make a business of'
it-spend days and weeks in the office
engaged in an occupation which, in ourjudgment, cannot lawfully be carried on
except under the immediate observation
of the clerk. Fees are given for eack
inspection, each abstract. The law has
in view the inspection of one chain of'
title-the status of one man-and fixes
a fee for that :" 51 Ga. 395,396.
When Beaz v. People was cited to.
the Wisconsin Court, in Hansoz v.
Eichstaedt, a distinction was suggested
by CASSODAY, J. (69 Wis. 541-2), based
upon the fee bill of the several clerks
and recorders (Gen. Stat. Colorado, p.
268, SEC. 584); hence, the abstracting
of the entire records, if permitted
would compel the recorder "to aid
in building up a rival establishment,
which would necessarily reduce the
emoluments of his office, and without
any statute, in terms, requiring him to
do so:" Id. 69 Wis. 542.
JOHN B. UHLE.

